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Abstract. This paper, combining the standpoints of philosophy and
Artificial Intelligence with theoretical psychology, summarises several
decades of investigation by the author of the variety of functions of vision
in humans and other animals, pointing out that biological evolution has
solved many more problems than are normally noticed. For example, the
biological functions of human and animal vision are closely related to the
ability of humans to do mathematics, including discovering and proving
theorems in geometry, topology and arithmetic. Many of the phenomena
discovered by psychologists and neuroscientists require sophisticated con-
trolled laboratory settings and specialised measuring equipment, whereas
the functions of vision reported here mostly require only careful attention
to a wide range of everyday competences that easily go unnoticed. Cur-
rently available computer models and neural theories are very far from
explaining those functions, so progress in explaining how vision works
is more in need of new proposals for explanatory mechanisms than new
laboratory data. Systematically formulating the requirements for such
mechanisms is not easy. If we start by analysing familiar competences,
that can suggest new experiments to clarify precise forms of these com-
petences, how they develop within individuals, which other species have
them, and how performance varies according to conditions. This will
help to constrain requirements for models purporting to explain how the
competences work. For example, Gibson’s theory of affordances needs
a number of extensions, including allowing affordances to be composed
in several ways from lower level proto-affordances. The paper ends with
speculations regarding the need for new kinds of information-processing
machinery to account for the phenomena.
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1 From Kant to Gibson and Beyond
1.1 What are the Functions of Vision?
The purpose of the workshop for which this paper was prepared was to discuss
a computational approach to “Closing the gap between behaviour and neuro-
physiological level”. My approach to this topic is to focus almost entirely on
what needs to be explained rather than to present any neurophysiological model,
though conjectures regarding some of the design features required in such a model
are offered in Section 7.
This is one of a series of interim reports on a journey towards understanding
human vision as forming a subset of a large collection of competences within an
integrated multi-functional, self-extending information-processing architecture: a
whole mind. Over several decades I have been trying, as a philosopher-designer,
to understand what the functions of vision are, and how vision relates to the
rest of the information-processing architecture, especially in humans but also
in other animals. This paper adds some observations arising in part from work
on a project to explore requirements and possible designs for a robot that can
perceive and manipulate 3-D objects. The main outcome has been expanding
the list of human visual capabilities that we still do not know how to explain.
My initial motivation came from trying to understand the role of visual
processing in mathematical discovery and reasoning, for instance in proving the-
orems in elementary Euclidean geometry, but also in more abstract reasoning,
for example about infinite structures, which can be visualised but cannot occur
in the environment. This work started in my DPhil [1], which was an attempt
to defend the view of mathematical knowledge as both non-empirical and syn-
thetic, proposed by [2], but rejected by many contemporary mathematicians and
philosophers. This is a topic that links many disciplines, including mathematics,
psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, linguistics, education and, since the 1950s,
Artificial Intelligence.1
1 For details see [3] and “Could a child robot grow up to be a mathematician and
philosopher?” (PDF presentation) available online here:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#math-robot
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1.2 Vision’s Role in Mathematical Discovery
I shall try to show how the role of vision in mathematical reasoning is connected
with the ability in humans and some other animals to perceive and reason about
structures and processes in the environment, including possible processes that
are not actually occurring.
Studying vision’s role as the basis for important human mathematical com-
petences focuses attention on aspects of vision that are ignored by most other
researchers including: those who study vision as concerned with image structure
(e.g. [4]); those who study vision as a source of geometrical and physical facts
about the environment (e.g. [5]); those who regard vision as primarily a means
of controlling behaviour (e.g. [6] and many recent researchers in AI/Robotics
and psychology who regard cognition as closely tied to embodiment); and those
who regard vision as acquisition of information about affordances (e.g. [7,8]).
The work of James Gibson on affordances comes close to identifying compe-
tences related to mathematics, but I shall show that his theory has to be broad-
ened in various ways, especially since perception of affordances depends on per-
ception of what I call proto-affordances (Sections 4, 4.2 and 5.1), which include
actual and possible processes not necessarily produced by the perceiver. The
ability to represent combinations of proto-affordances is important for perceiv-
ing more complex affordances, for predicting and planning future processes, for
explaining past events and for understanding vicarious affordances (Section 4.3).
The ability to perceive and reason about combinations of and interactions be-
tween proto-affordances (Section 5.8) is the core of the connection between func-
tions of vision and mathematical competences, as explained in later sections.
Analysis of examples reveals further details, including the need to be able
to use an “exosomatic” ontology referring to things in the environment (e.g.
3-D surface and processes involving them) as opposed to patterns in sensory
and motor signals. Other competences requiring extended ontologies are also
mentioned, e.g. the meta-semantic ability to see mental states of others, such as
emotional states (Section 6.6).
For a full understanding of what evolution has achieved and what future
robots may have to do, we need parallel investigations of many different kinds
of vision: in insects and other invertebrates, in birds, in primates, etc. There
are some who believe that all research should start from the simplest systems
and work up, but it is better to avoid both dogmatism and narrowness, and see
what can be learnt by explorations pursing different directions, as long as the
explorers communicate.
1.3 Scientific Communication Problems
Communication requires shared concepts, however, and that can be a problem.
Much philosophical research is connected with the fact that we can have a col-
lection of words that we are very familiar with, and use successfully in day to
day communication, but whose mode of operation is far more complex than we
realise, because they correspond to concepts whose structure is not obvious (e.g.
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“truth”, “knowledge”, “understanding”, “consciousness”, “justification”, “sci-
ence” and “emotion”). As a result, when such words are used to define scientific
objectives or report results of scientific investigations, researchers often fail to no-
tice disparities between their everyday use of the concepts and their professional
use: disparities that can obstruct the advance of knowledge, by obscuring the
differences between what researchers have actually achieved, and their claims to
have modelled phenomena they describe as “seeing”, “learning”, “understanding
language”, “feeling emotions”, or “being conscious”. A similar point was made
by [9], in a criticism of many AI research reports.
I shall illustrate this by showing that our ordinary concept of “seeing” covers
everyday human achievements that go far beyond the topics normally studied
in empirical and computational research on vision. In particular, seeing is not
restricted to information about what exists in the environment: Seeing what is
possible or impossible (discussed in more detail in [10], and below in sections 4
and 6) is different from seeing what exists, and requires different mechanisms and
forms of representation. J.J. Gibson’s (1979) notion of perception of affordances
turns out to be a special case.
1.4 Why Complete Architectures Matter
Ordinary phenomena of seeing inherently involve interactions between sensory
mechanisms, action-control mechanisms and more central systems that arise
from different stages in our evolutionary history and grow during different stages
in individual development. So the functions of vision differ from one species
to another and can change over time within an individual as the information-
processing architecture grows. Some of those developments, such as what lan-
guage the individual learns to read, or which gestures are understood, are culture-
specific.
A full understanding of vision requires investigation of different multifunc-
tional architectures in which visual systems with different collections of compe-
tences can exist.
An architecture with more sophisticated ‘central’ mechanisms can make pos-
sible more sophisticated visual functions. For instance, a central mechanism able
to use an ontology of causal and functional roles is required for a system that
can see something causing, preventing, or enabling something else to occur. The
ability to make use of an ontology including mental states (a meta-semantic on-
tology) is required if a visual system is to be able to perceive facial expressions,
such as happiness, sadness, surprise, etc. and make use of the information.
The requirement to use such ontologies is ignored by machine vision re-
searchers who train pattern recognisers to attach labels to pictures on the basis
of 2-D image features. Linking labels such as “happy” and “sad” with image fea-
tures, without any understanding of the causes of happy or sad mental states or
their likely consequences, does not constitute seeing someone as looking happy
or sad. Likewise, seeing 3-D structures and processes, and causal interactions
between them, requires the use of an ontology that refers to contents of a 3-D
environment, which is quite different from being trained to use a set of labels
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for 2-D images or image sequences generated by such an environment. Under-
standing a 3-D ontology involves being able to ask and answer questions about
surfaces and volumes, about spatial relations, about kinds of motion, about kinds
of interaction, and being able use the information in planning or controlling ac-
tions, and being able to explain perceived events. More subtly, it can involve
discovering the need to extend the ontology beyond what can be sensed, e.g. to
include different physical substances and their properties. These requirements
are discussed further in Section 5.
1.5 Links to Philosophy
Many philosophers who study problems relating to human minds and human
knowledge, focus mainly on trying to clarify how our current concepts work,
for example [11] (who described conceptual analysis as studying “logical geogra-
phy” of concepts), and work referred to in [12]. There is an alternative approach.
Instead of simply analysing how our ordinary concepts referring to mental phe-
nomena work, since learning about AI and the design-based approach to under-
standing minds, around 1969, I have been trying to characterise deeper aspects
of the functions performed by human minds (including their visual sub-systems).
This exposes a more varied collection of functions than our ordinary concepts
categorise and distinguish. [13] describes the underlying space of possibilities as
defining a “logical topography”, on the basis of which we can show that familiar
sets of concepts provide only one among many “logical geographies”, just as a
portion of terrain can be divided into political or social regions in different ways.
By analysing the different sets of functions supported by different
information-processing architectures we can come up with a theory-based survey
of possibilities for a mind or a visual system. For each system design there is a
specific “logical topography”, a set of possible states, processes and causal inter-
actions that can occur within the architecture, some involving also interactions
with the environment.
The set of possibilities generated by each architecture can be subdivided and
categorised in different ways for different purposes. E.g. the purposes of common
sense classification are different from the purposes of scientific explanation.
If we adopt the design-based approach when observing actual performances
by adult humans, infants, toddlers, nest-building birds, squirrels, and other ani-
mals, and constantly ask “how could that work”, we can generate various collec-
tions of requirements for information-processing architectures and mechanisms
that could support the observed variety of visual functions in robots. Very often,
it is not obvious whether a particular theory meets that criterion: so using a the-
ory as a basis for designing, implementing and testing working artificial systems
is a crucial part of the process of explaining how natural systems work.
This sort of enquiry can often reveal serious confusions and over-
simplifications in our ordinary concepts, even though they work well enough
most of the time in non-scientific contexts. For example, notions like “learning”,
and “memory” are normally used in ignorance of the variety of ways in which
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complex information-processing systems can acquire and use information, and
adapt themselves to changing circumstances, on various time scales.
Fig. 1. Many people see nothing wrong with the contents of this circle, but can
be shown to have acquired all the information, without making use of it.
1.6 The Logical Geography of Our Talk About Seeing
Similar comments can be made about the ordinary use of “see”. For example,
many people think it is impossible to see something without being conscious that
you have seen it, yet there are cases where people perform actions that require
seeing things even though they would not be described as being conscious of what
they see. Opening a door while sleep-walking, and not remembering stopping at
a red traffic light while driving to work are examples.
Figure 1 gives another example. Some people cannot see anything wrong
with the phrase displayed even when pressed repeatedly to look very carefully.
A subset of those individuals can then be asked while their eyes are shut “Where
was the ‘the’?”, or “How many words were there?”. At that point some of them
notice the mistake in the phrase. Presumably some part of them did see what
was there, and stored the information but did not use it until it was required for
answering a different question about the contents of the display. Similar results
are available from many laboratory experiments in visual and auditory percep-
tion (e.g. dichotic listening experiments). We can clarify different concepts of
seeing by analysing architectures that do, and architectures that do not support
what could be called “unconscious seeing”.
Another example is the common assumption that, when not hallucinating, we
see only things that exist in the environment. That may be a correct assumption
as regards the functions of vision in insects and other animals. Yet, as will be
explained in Sections 4, 4.2 and 5.1, seeing affordances, and seeing the lower-
level proto-affordances they include, involves seeing the possibility of actions
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that can be performed and processes that can occur, and also seeing constraints
on such possibilities. This involves seeing that some things that do not exist in
the environment can or cannot occur in that environment. If an architecture
supports that kind of seeing, it is misguided to look for retinal projections of
what is seen: something that does not exist cannot be projected to form an
image.
Gibson’s work can be seen as making this sort of point, though I shall try to
show that his objections to naive notions of the functions of vision do not go far
enough, because he did not see that affordances are a subset of a more general
class (implicitly acknowledged after his death in [8]).
There are many other conceptual confusions related to notions like “feeling”,
“consciousness”, “emotion”, “understanding”, and “attention” that can be clar-
ified in terms of different sets of capabilities supported by different architectures
[14]. Researchers working on functions of mind and vision often focus on a narrow
range of functions, without asking how the functions studied fit into a complete
architecture.
Many specific visual functions have been modelled in working systems, but
currently available AI techniques still leave large gaps, and all existing models
will probably be viewed as toys when we look back at them fifty or a hun-
dred years from now, because they account for such a small subset of human
or animal competences. That criticism applies also to my own system-building
experiments, done with colleagues and students (including the Popeye system
mentioned below).
Although designing and testing working systems is often informative, what
may be of longer-lasting value, as suggested in [15], is assembling ever-expanding
sets of requirements and sketching out a sequence of very high level designs for
meeting more and more of those requirements, while testing the designs wherever
possible both by model building and by deriving predictions that can be checked
in laboratories or in fieldwork. However, outline designs for systems meeting a
large collection of requirements are very difficult to implement at present.
This paper should be viewed as work-in-progress, reporting some of the re-
sults of extended exploration of requirements for human-like visual systems. It
describes some unobvious, yet important, functions of vision that need to be ex-
plained by specifications of a working machine that could serve those functions
in addition to the more obvious functions. The paper ends with some spec-
ulations about sorts of mechanisms (using a large collections of multi-stable,
interlinked dynamical systems) that may be required, and which do not yet ex-
ist in any known computational models, and which may be hard to identify in
neural mechanisms, using current observational techniques.
2 The Need to Compare Alternative Designs
2.1 Niche Space and Design Space
Understanding how a complex system works includes knowing what would hap-
pen if various aspects of the design were different, or missing. So understanding
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how humans work requires us to relate the human case to many others, namely
other products of biological evolution and possible future engineering products.
The comparison with different biological designs extends a familiar theme for
neuropsychologists, namely attempting to understand normal human functions
by comparing them with various effects of brain damage or genetic brain abnor-
mality.
Fig. 2. To understand human capabilities we need to know what requirements and
constraints they satisfy, i.e. where they fit in niche space, and also what sorts
of designs for information-processing systems can meet those requirements, i.e.
where we fit in design space, and how those spaces are related.
We can summarise this as follows (building on [16,17,18,19,20]): We need to
study the space of possible sets of requirements or niches, niche space, and we
need to study the space of possible designs for working systems that can meet
different sets of requirements, design space. And as suggested in Figure 2 we
need to understand the various relationships between regions of design space
and regions of niche space. Of course, in their full generality these two spaces
are far too large to be studied, so we must find ways of homing in on appropriate
“neighbourhoods” in those spaces. Unfortunately, it is often tempting to do that
in a way that is strongly influenced by the mechanisms and formalisms we are
familiar with, which can cause us to be blind to some of the things that need to be
explained. An example discussed later is the failure of researchers to notice that
much of what we see consists of processes in the environment, because our current
tools are much better suited to investigations of perception and recognition of
static structures. Another common hindrance is that many researchers know
only how to build software that manipulates numerical information, so they
ignore the requirement to build visual systems that are capable of producing
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structural descriptions of perceived entities, processes and unrealised possibilities
(including affordances). Moreover, the currently available computational tools
for creating and manipulating complex information structures do not seem to be
up to some of the tasks described below in connection with spatial reasoning. By
examining requirements that are often ignored we may accelerate development
of suitable information-processing mechanisms.
Our notion of niche space is not the same as the notion of niche space of a
type of organism used by biologists, a notion that is concerned with the space of
possible environments a particular kind of organism can live and reproduce in.
Our notion covers sets of requirements for all possible organisms and robots.
The study of niche space and design space should help us understand how the
two spaces are related: which regions of design space map onto which regions of
niche space, and in which ways different designs meet or fail to meet particular
sets of requirements, or meet them more or less well. This requires a descriptive
notion of biological fitness, which specifies how the competences provided by
an implemented design relate to the various competences specified in a set of
requirements.
This is much richer and more complex than any numerical notion of biological
fitness measured in terms of survival value, or number of progeny. No numerical
measure that produces a linear ordering of cases is adequate for understand-
ing any family of complex designs: the numerical information, or position in
a ranking, loses far too much detailed information about specific benefits and
disadvantages of various design features in different niches to be a useful evalua-
tion criterion – like most numerical evaluation functions used in computational
models of evolution or learning. When a design involves cooperating parts, as-
signing a number, or ranking to the whole design does not provide information
about the strengths and weaknesses, or even the functions, of the component de-
signs. Contrast the production of numerical values with the detailed information
about advantages and disadvantages of various alternative products in consumer
research reports, e.g. in Which? magazine.
Full understanding of particular subsets of design space and niche space re-
quires us to explain the pressures that lead to changes over time as systems
in those subsets both evolve across generations and support development and
learning within individuals. So we also need to understand trajectories in both
spaces, some of which are evolutionary trajectories of species, some develop-
mental trajectories of individuals, and some social or cultural trajectories. The
evolutionary trajectories can include changes within some components of an
organism for which other components define the niche. Some evolutionary de-
velopments primarily involve changes in behaviours of organisms rather than
physical structures, though physical changes may follow. A broader view would
also take in trajectories followed by ecosystems containing many species.
2.2 Varieties of Representation: Generalised Languages (GLs)
Complex systems may differ in many ways, some of which are described later.
A particularly important feature of any information-processing system is how it
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is capable of encoding information during various stages of acquisition, analysis,
storage, retrieval, and use of the information. Researchers designing computa-
tional models often have commitments to particular forms of representation,2
since those are the ones for which they have programming tools. Those com-
mitments can severely restrict the kinds of research questions they ask, and the
answers they consider.
For example, many researchers who use neural nets will make heavy use of
vectors of numerical values, matrices for transforming vectors, and algorithms
designed for controlling such numerical transformations. A different kind of re-
searcher will be more inclined to use symbolic structures such as trees and graphs,
for example trees used to represent syntactic structures of sentences or plans,
and graphs used to represent maps, partially ordered plans, or the structures in
images.
There are many scientific disputes regarding whether non-human animals can
learn to use a language. However these disputes are posed in terms of a notion
of language that has certain features common to human languages, including
(a) structural variability of sentences (sentences can have more or less complex
syntactic structures, with different levels of nesting), (b) compositional semantics
(the meaning of a complex whole depends systematically on the meanings of the
parts and how they are assembled, which allows novel meanings to be expressed
or understood), (c) use of linear sequences of arbitrary symbols to form sentences
and (d) the use of sentences for communication between individuals.
If we drop condition (c), namely use of linear sequences of arbitrary symbols,
then we can allow use of spatial structures combined spatially in different ways
(as in maps, diagrams, pictures, flow-charts etc.). Dropping that constraint al-
lows us to consider a wider variety of forms of representation that satisfy the
first two conditions, namely structural variability and compositional semantics.
If we drop condition (d), namely use of symbols for communication, then we can
still allow other uses such as thinking, reasoning, planning, or perceiving com-
plex scenes. A further generalisation is to allow semantics of complex wholes to
depend not only on constituents and structure but also context. This relaxation
is normal for indexicals (linguistic components such as “now”, “that”, “you”,
etc). We can generalise the role of context in resolving ambiguity in ways that
would take too long to explain here.3
The resulting notion of a language, a Generalised Language, (G-language or
GL) requiring only conditions (a) and (b) was proposed in [21] and elaborated
in [22]. A neural model that excludes the possibility of GLs used internally for
various purposes such as perception of processes and structures, planning future
2 I use the word “representation” to refer to whatever is used to encode information.
It could be some physical structure or process, or a structure or process in a virtual
machine. It could be transient or enduring. It may be used for a single function or
for many functions. See also
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/
whats-information.html
3 A partial account is in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0605
Architectural and Representational Requirements 11
actions, thinking about what might happen, and reasoning about possible conse-
quences of processes in the environment would be incapable of meeting some of
the requirements described below. Future robots are likely to need internal GLs
of various sorts, possibly including some geometrical and topological components
in addition to discrete symbols. Spatial forms of representation have often been
proposed as having advantages in certain contexts compared with more logical,
or sentential, forms of representation, e.g. [23,24,25,26].
Preverbal children and many non-human animals can perceive and react to
processes as they occur. That requires mechanisms providing the ability to repre-
sent changes while they happen. Perhaps the same mechanisms, or closely related
mechanisms, can be used to reason about processes that are not happening. If
some other primates and very young children use internal GLs, that suggests
strongly that GLs supporting structural variability and compositional semantics
evolved before external human languages used for communication, and that GLs
also precede the learning of communicative language in individual humans.4
We shall later give several examples of human visual competences, including
geometric reasoning competences, that seem to require use of GLs, for example
in Sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.8, 6, 6.11, 6.12, and 7. The suggestion that GLs are used
for all these purposes, including the representation of processes at different levels
of abstraction, poses deep questions for brain science, as we’ll see later.
3 Wholes and Parts: Beyond “Scaling Up”
Most of the rest of this paper addresses only a small subset of the problems,
concerned with requirements for visual systems. Some high level features of pos-
sible mechanisms for satisfying those requirements will also be discussed near
the end, in Section 7.
3.1 Putting the Pieces Together: “Scaling Out”
This investigation is motivated by interest in a larger set of problems, not just
explaining vision. The larger set of problems includes understanding information-
processing requirements for a human-like (or chimp-like, or crow-like) organism
to perceive, act and learn in the environment. We also aim to produce design
requirements for human-like or animal-like robots, and if possible to sketch some
features of designs capable of meeting those requirements.
This means that the designs for mechanisms providing particular compe-
tences (e.g. visual competences) must “scale out”: instances of a design must
be capable of interacting with other components in a larger design that satisfies
requirements for the complete animal or robot.
This contrasts with the frequently mentioned need to “scale up”, namely cop-
ing successfully with larger and more complex inputs. Many human competences
4 As explained in more detail in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/talks/#glang
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do not scale up, including parsing, planning, and problem-solving competences.
It is possible to produce a highly efficient implementation of some competence
that scales up very well but does not scale out: it cannot be integrated with other
human competences. Numerical competences of current computers are an obvi-
ous example. Less obviously, the most impressive programs that perform board
games do not scale out. Even less obviously, I suspect that none of the current
implementations of linguistic processing, vision, planning, or problem-solving
can scale out. In particular, they are generally designed to work on their own
in some test situation, not to work with one another. More detailed examples of
the scaling-out requirement are provided later, e.g. in Sections 5 and 6.4.
3.2 Understanding Tradeoffs: Regions in Design Space
Most AI researchers (and most funding agencies interested in AI) are motivated
mainly by the goal of producing new useful machines, and therefore have little
interest in this comparative investigation of different sets of naturally occurring
requirements and designs, produced by evolutionary and developmental pro-
cesses in biology. If something works well for a practical application, the fact
that it does not scale out, i.e. cannot easily be integrated within a multifunc-
tional architecture combining many human abilities, may be irrelevant to the
goals of the designers.
However, ignoring these existence proofs can lead to unsuccessful, blinkered
searches for solutions to hard engineering problems.
Like some of the founders of AI, I am more concerned with trying to advance
understanding of how humans and other animals work than with building new
machines, but unlike most of them I believe this requires trying to understand
human information-processing mechanisms, not just in their own terms, but as
a special case of something more general that takes different forms in different
animals, and in different sorts of possible robots. Thus the goal is not what some
people describe as achieving “human-level AI”, but something more general.5
3.3 Biological Mechanisms vs Biological Wholes
For several decades the relevance of biological mechanisms for AI (e.g. neural
nets and evolutionary computations) has been recognised. What is relatively
5 This cross-disciplinary, cross-species, approach has been promoted in a number of
tutorials and workshops, including the Tutorial on “Representation and learning in
robots and animals” at IJCAI’05 http:
//www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/conferences/edinburgh-05.html,
the AISB’06 Symposium http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/gc/aisb06/,
the Workshop on “Natural and Artificial Cognition” in June 2007
http://tecolote.isi.edu/∼wkerr/wonac/,
this BBSRC workshop http://comp-psych.bham.ac.uk/workshop.htm
and the CoSy project’s “Meeting of Minds” workshop in September 2007 http:
//www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/conferences/mofm-paris-07/,
among many others.
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new in the computational modelling community is moving beyond studying what
biological mechanisms can do, to finding out what whole animals, can do and
how they do it, which is one way of studying requirements to be met by new
designs.
Finding out how information flows around brain circuits connected to the
eyes, which has received a lot of attention prompted by new non-invasive ma-
chinery for measuring what goes on in brains, does not tell us what the informa-
tion is, how it is represented, or what the information is used to achieve, which
can include things as diverse as fine-grained motor control, triggering saccades,
aesthetic enjoyment, recognition of terrain, finding out how something works, or
control of intermediate processes that perform abstract internal tasks.
It is possible to make progress in the case of simple organisms where neuro-
physiology corresponds closely to information-processing functions. Measuring
brain processes may be informative in connection with evolutionarily older, sim-
pler, neural circuits (e.g. some reflexes), but many of the newer functions are
extremely abstract, and probably only very indirectly related to specific neu-
ral events. In those cases, results of brain imaging may show some correlations
without explaining what is being done or how it is being done. For example, if
speakers of two very different languages with different phonetic structures, dif-
ferent grammars, and different vocabularies are given some piece of information
(e.g. that a hungry lion is nearby) the brain processes involved in acquiring that
information will be very different, and may differ even for speakers of the same
language, depending on what those speakers have learnt and in what order.
Suppose that when two such individuals hear and understand reports with
the same semantic content, similar parts of their brains show increased activity:
that will not answer any of the deep questions about how understanding works.
E.g. we shall be no nearer knowing how to produce a working model with the
same functionality.
The journey towards full understanding still has a long way to go, and may
even be endless, since human minds, other animal minds and robot minds can
vary indefinitely. This multidisciplinary research programme is very different
from doing experimental psychology, studying brain mechanisms, or building
intelligent machines, yet combines aspects of all of them, along with studies of
philosophy, evolution, ethology and linguistics, as illustrated in [21,27,28,22].
A problem for such a programme is the difficulty of evaluating intermedi-
ate results. Over-emphasising the need for falsifiable hypotheses can slow down
scientific creativity. Instead, as proposed by [29] (who extended some of Pop-
per’s ideas), we need to allow that distinguishing degenerative and progressive
research programmes can take years, or decades.
3.4 Models That “Scale Out”
It should now be clear that being biologically inspired need not bring any ad-
vances. For example, some computational modellers try to derive requirements
from results of laboratory experiments on humans. If different highly constrained
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laboratory tasks produce different reaction times, or if certain changes in a vi-
sual task increase error rates, or if performance changes in a certain way as
a result of practice, then AI researchers sometimes set themselves the goal of
designing working systems that perform the same tasks, while mimicking the
time differences, error rate changes and other features of the experimental data.
But designing an AI model to match observed performance in such a laboratory
experiment leaves open the question: does that model “scale out”, i.e. can it be
extended to form part of a larger model meeting a much wider range of require-
ments? Not all mechanisms that perform like part of a system are useful parts
of something that performs like the whole system.
If not all the requirements for a machine have been specified, then it may be
possible to produce a working design that meets the partial requirements but
which cannot be extended to a design that satisfies all the requirements, because
it meets the partial requirements in the wrong way.
For example, if you want a machine to model a good human chess player,
then part of the requirement is that the machine should be able to win games
of chess against good human players without taking much longer than humans
do to make each move. We already have such chess playing machines. But if
you add other requirements, such as that the player should be able to give
advice to a weaker player, not by specifying moves for particular board positions
but by playing in such a way as to help the weaker player learn both from
mistakes and from successes, then it turns out that the obvious designs that
do well as competent chess-players are not easily extendable to meet the further
requirements, because they blindly execute algorithms (programmed or produced
by training) without knowing what they do or why. Such reflective knowledge is
not necessary for winning, if the available machines are fast enough to produce
results by exhaustive search. However knowledge about higher level features of
various games is necessary for explaining how to win, or how to avoid different
ways of losing, and for choosing a style of play that is tailored to a learner’s
needs.
The ability of a design with functionality F1 to scale out to include new
functionality F2 is partly a matter of degree: it depends on how much extra
mechanism is needed to provide F2. The more essential use the extra mechanism
makes of the original mechanism, the better the original mechanism scales out.
A computer vision system can be very good at being trained to recognise
certain classes of objects in images, and to match experimental observations,
without being extendable so that it can understand why the same object looks
different from different viewpoints, and how the appearance changes as the view-
point changes. (Note that understanding why could simply involve being able
to predict such changes, and being able to plan appearance changes in order to
gain new information. It need not involve being able to explain why, or even to
formulate the generalisations in any communication.) Further, insofar as recog-
nition merely involves being able to apply a label to a portion of an image, it
need not be extendable so as to allow the machine to see what actions can be
performed on different objects or what the consequences of those actions will be.
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3.5 Vision and Mathematical Reasoning
Most people would not see human mathematical abilities as relevant to the func-
tions of vision, whereas my interest in understanding vision started when I was
doing a DPhil in philosophy [1] attempting to defend Kant’s philosophy of math-
ematics against the then prevalent Humean empiricist thesis that all knowledge
that is not empirical must be essentially trivial, like the ‘definitional’ knowledge
that all triangles have three angles and that all prime numbers have no proper
divisors. These are analogous to ‘All bachelors are unmarried’, conveying nothing
more than you already know if you understand the words. Many philosophers
call such propositions “analytic” [30].
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had claimed, in opposition to Hume,
that there are ways of discovering new truths that extend our knowledge (i.e. they
are “synthetic”, not analytic) and which are not empirical. He included truths
of arithmetic and geometry, such as the truth that seven plus five equals twelve
and the truth that the space occupied by a left hand cannot be superimposed
on the space occupied by a right hand, no matter how much they are translated
and rotated in 3-D space.
My previous experience as a mathematics student convinced me that Hume
and contemporary analytic philosophers were wrong and Kant was right. Discov-
ering or understanding a proof is both different from empirically investigating
how the world works and different from reflecting on and rephrasing definitions.
Building on the work of Frege and others, [31] tried to show that although
mathematics was non-trivial it could all be reduced to logic (Frege thought that
was true of arithmetic but not geometry), whereas I, like many mathematicians,
knew from first hand experience that doing mathematics often used spatial rea-
soning rather than logical reasoning alone.
When trying to prove a theorem, mathematicians frequently use the ability to
see both structural relationships and also the possibility of and the consequences
of changing such relationships. For instance, if you look at a triangle with vertices
labelled A, B and C, you can see that it is possible to draw a straight line from
any vertex, e.g. A, to the point which I’ll refer to as M, the middle of the line
BC, the opposite side. Even without drawing the line AM, you can see that
doing so will produce two triangles sharing a side. You can also see that those
two triangles have co-linear sides of the same length: BM and CM, both of which
are the same perpendicular distance from the opposite vertex A. From this you
can infer that the two triangles must also have the same area, showing that the
line AM divides the original triangle into two triangles of the same area, even
though in general they will have different shapes.
I am not claiming that every human being can see these things. Clearly
very young children cannot. Moreover, the ability may develop only in certain
environments.
What exactly ‘see’ means here requires explanation: some would prefer to
say that they ‘infer visually’, or something like that. The point is that, however
we describe the ability, it is connected with visual competences and needs to be
explained by any adequate theory of how human vision works. Some readers will
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already have noticed a connection with Gibson’s theory of affordances, discussed
in later sections. It turns out that his theory has to be extended to account for
the role of vision in reasoning.
Looking at a physical triangle is not necessary. Even when thinking about an
imaginary triangle rather than one drawn on paper, many people can visualise
drawing new lines and can reason visually about the consequences. You probably
did that when reading my description of what could be done to the triangle,
since I deliberately did not provide a figure. Some mathematicians reading my
example will be able to translate the theorem into a logical form, and then work
out a derivation from some logical formalisation of Euclidean geometry, such as
Hilbert’s axiomatisation, but they are rare. I am not denying that it is possible
to do geometry only within a logical framework, but it is certainly unusual.
Most mathematicians first discover proofs geometrically even if they belong to
the mathematical sub-culture that feels duty bound later on to produce a purely
logical version. That obligation was challenged in Appendix II of [1], which
argued that an extra-logical justification is required for accepting the logical
axioms and rules as adequate to the purpose.6
Not all mathematical discoveries are based on visual reasoning. For example,
very different discoveries, some of them documented in Chapter 8 of [32], occur
as a child learns to count, and then (sometimes unconsciously) discovers different
uses for the counting process and different features of the counting process, such
as the fact that the result of counting a collection of objects is not altered by
rearranging the objects but can be altered by breaking one of the objects into two
objects. That kind of mathematical discovery depends on perceiving structures
and relationships in procedures that can be followed.
Sometimes abstract structures relating the application of procedures, have
to be noticed, rather than spatial structures and relationships. For example, a
child who has learnt to count may discover that in order to work out the size
of the set formed by combining a collection of M objects and a collection of N
objects all it has to do is recite N numerals after M. E.g. reciting three numerals
after “five” gives “six, seven, eight”. A child may discover this for a few cases
and then notice that there is a general pattern that can always be relied on. This
depends on an information-processing architecture that includes self-observation
mechanisms that (a) detect features of the processes generated when procedures
are applied, (b) work out a common pattern and then (c) notice new instances of
that pattern. The ability to understand why the pattern can be relied on always
to work requires additional capabilities in the architecture, and usually develops
later, as part of the process of becoming a young mathematician. (This process
is often terminated by going to school.)
In contrast, simultaneous perception of spatial and temporal relationships
can lead to the discovery that any one-to-one mapping between elements of two
finite sets can be converted into any other such mapping by successively swapping
ends of mappings, as illustrated in Figure 3. This sort of discovery requires quite
6 Hilbert’s axiomatisation of Euclidean geometry is conveniently available at: http:
//www.math.umbc.edu/∼campbell/Math306Spr02/Axioms/Hilbert.html
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Fig. 3. A child may first discover empirically that any one-to-one mapping from
one set of objects to another (e.g. the grey arrows) can be converted to any other
such one-to-one mapping (e.g. the black arrows) by swapping ends on one side,
two at a time. E.g. the right hand ends of the grey arrow from A to G and the
grey arrow from D to E can be swapped, then the right hand ends of arrows
from B to H and from C to F, etc. gradually eliminating discrepant mappings.
Formulating the general algorithm is left as an exercise for the reader. How does
the visual system find a discrepant mapping? How does it find another to swap
with it?
abstract visual capabilities. For example, vision is needed to detect a remaining
discrepant mapping (e.g. the grey link that goes from B to H instead of from B
to F, in the figure). Then it is necessary to find a mapping with which to swap it,
namely the mapping that goes to F from C. If the right hand ends are swapped
the new mapping from B to F can be left thereafter. However the new mapping
from C to H will then need to be swapped with one that goes to G.
Initially the procedure might be followed using physical links, e.g. lines drawn
on paper that are rubbed out and redrawn, or coloured threads joining objects
which can be relocated. Later the young mathematician can simulate the process,
i.e. imagine doing it, in order to work out the consequences, without actually
changing anything in the environment.
A side effect of applying such a strategy repeatedly, seems to be production of
implicit understanding that it will always work, even if the child cannot articulate
the strategy nor explain why it works.
This seems to depend on the architecture allowing one process to observe that
another process has some consequences that do not depend on the particularities
of the example, and which are therefore necessary consequences of the procedure.
This discovery may use the fact that the visualising or imagining process ignores
details that can vary from case to case.
It is worth noting (as argued in [1]) that even using explicit logical reasoning
depends on the ability to visualise structural relations between symbolic struc-
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tures, and possible structural changes, e.g. constructing a new proposition using
components of premiss propositions.
3.6 Development of Visual Competences
Many people can see and think about geometrical possibilities and relationships.
Very young children cannot see all of them, let alone think about them. Why not?
And what has to change in their minds and brains to enable them to see such
things? Answering those questions will require explaining how such mathematical
visual reasoning works and what needs to develop in order to allow it to work.
There are developments that would not normally be described as mathemat-
ical, yet are closely related to mathematical competences. For example, a very
young child who can easily insert one plastic cup into another may be able to
lift a number of cut-out pictures of objects the child can recognise from recesses,
and know which recess each picture belongs to, but be unable to get a back into
is recess: the picture is placed in roughly the right location and pressed hard, but
that is not enough. The child apparently has not yet extended his or her ontology
to include boundaries of objects and alignment of boundaries. The problem does
not arise for circular cups because of their symmetry. Some time later such a
child will easily insert a picture into its recess, presumably after learning about
alignment of boundaries.
How such extension of competences happens is not known. Such learning
may include at least three related aspects:
– developing new forms of representation;
– extending the learner’s ontology to allow new kinds of things that exist;
– developing new ways of manipulating representations for purposes of per-
ception, planning or reasoning, including acquiring new algorithms.
In some cases there is also development of new motor skills making use of the
new cognitive competences, e.g. learning to play a musical instrument or play a
competitive game.
When all of those developments have occurred and the new extensions have
been used a lot, many special cases of their use can be developed and stored
for rapid retrieval and use, allowing new problems to be solved far more quickly
than before. Such components can then be building blocks used in further de-
velopments. Learning to read text or music illustrates all of this very well.
In the case of the child playing with puzzle pieces, what has to be learnt,
namely facts about boundaries and how they constrain possible movements, is
something that can be studied mathematically. Presumably what the very young
child learns is a precursor to being able to think mathematically about bounded
regions of a plane. Later mathematical education will build on general abilities
to see structures and processes and see how some structures can constrain or
facilitate certain processes, as illustrated in [33]. This is related to, but more
general than, learning about affordances, as explained in the next section.
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4 Affordance-related Visual Competences: Seeing
Processes and Possibilities
4.1 Perceiving and Reasoning About Changes
Visual, geometrical, reasoning capabilities depend on several visual competences,
such as: (a) the ability to attend to parts and relationships of a complex object,
including “abstract” parts like the midpoint of a line and relationships between
widely separated objects or features, such as collinearity, similarity of size, or
parallelism, (b) the ability to discern the possibility of changing what is in the
scene, e.g. adding a new line, moving something to a new location, altering
a relationship between two or more objects, (c) the ability to work out the
consequences of making those changes, e.g. working out which new structures,
relationships and further possibilities for change will come into existence if those
changes are made.
One of the consequences of making a change is the production of a new set
of possibilities for change and constraints limiting further changes. For example,
drawing a new line across an old line produces a new point of intersection, and
new bounded regions in the neighbourhood of that point. These new features
can then be the basis of further changes, e.g. colouring a region, labelling the
point, using the point as the centre of a circle, etc. Being able to see such
possibilities in diagrams was part of the geometric reasoning capability discussed
in [23], and explored further in [16]. Later it became clear that such mathematical
capabilities are closely related to perception of what Gibson called “affordances”
[7,34].
It is not always noticed that both the ability to see and make use of affor-
dances and the ability to contemplate and reason about geometric constructions
depend on a more primitive and general competence, namely the ability to see
processes (as opposed to merely seeing structures), and the closely related abil-
ity to see the possibility of processes that are not actually occurring, and also
constraints that limit those possibilities. It seems unlikely that all animals that
have visual capabilities include these abilities to see that various processes are
possible even if they do not occur, or to see that some processes are blocked by
features of the environment that could be removed in order to allow the pro-
cesses to occur. This is one of the topics to be investigated in a study of different
regions of niche space and design space in biological systems.
Implicit in our discussion so far is the fact that “multi-strand” relationships
can hold between two objects, insofar as not only the whole objects are spatially
related (e.g. above, near, north-west of) but also parts of the object. Conse-
quently, when objects move that can produce “multi-strand processes”, in which
many relationships change simultaneously.
Gibson’s perceived affordances were concerned only with opportunities for
actions that the perceiver could perform, including moving towards, avoiding,
grasping, lifting, pushing, obstructing, catching, throwing, changing viewpoint,
etc. Most of these actions involve physical processes that have much in common
with processes in the environment that are not intentional actions, for instance
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objects blown in the wind, or a rotten branch breaking and falling because of
its weight. There are also processes that occur when intentional actions are
performed by others.
It is clear that most normal humans are able to perceive what is common be-
tween processes that they produce, processes that others produce and processes
that are not parts of anyone’s intentional actions, e.g. two surfaces coming to-
gether or moving apart, an object rotating, one object moving into or moving
past another, and so on. Being able to represent what is common to all processes
satisfying some abstract conditions independently of how then are perceived and
whether the agent initiates them imposes important requirements on the forms
of representation. It implies, for example, that representation of perceived pro-
cesses should not be restricted to incipient motor processes, even if incipient
motor processes sometimes play a role.
4.2 Proto-affordances and Possible Processes
Not only can we see such processes when they actually occur independently of
our own actions, we can also perceive and think about the possibility of such a
process occurring without having to regard it is an action we can produce, or a
process that can affect us. You can see a rock on a steep hillside and think about
what would happen if the rock started rolling down, no matter what the cause of
the rolling. In short, we can see what could be called proto-affordances: namely
relations in the environment that enable or constrain processes that are possible
in a situation. They could become parts of positive or negative affordances for the
perceiver under certain circumstances, but need not be regarded as affordances in
order to be seen, thought about, or predicted. The notion of a proto-affordance is
essentially the notion a situation in which some process can occur or is prevented
from occurring, or constrained in some way. This is different from the notion of a
micro-affordance, namely an affordance related to a small sub-action of an action
involved in an affordance, or a potentiated action triggered by seeing objects that
have affordances [35]. Proto-affordances need not involve actions.
The ability to see that certain processes are possible even when they are
not within the power of the perceiver to produce, i.e. the ability to perceive
proto-affordances, underlies the ability to perceive what we shall call “vicar-
ious” affordances, namely affordances for others. This requires the ability to
represent the possibility of things happening in the environment independently
of any of the perceiver’s goals being achieved or obstructed, and independently
of the agent doing anything in the environment. Thinking about future possible
processes extends that to representing processes that may occur in situations
that are not currently perceived – for instance thinking about what will happen
if it rains, or if the wind blows – without specifying any details or any specific
viewpoint. In other words, these abilities use an ontology that is not restricted to
sensorimotor contents. They need an “exosomatic ontology”, the ability to refer
to entities and processes that can exist outside the body, independently of any
sensory or motor signals. A pre-verbal child or non-verbal animal that can see
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and reason about such proto-affordances and vicarious affordances is probably
using a spatial GL, as suggested in Section 2.2.
4.3 Vicarious Affordances and Exosomatic Ontologies
When perceived possibilities involve what someone else can or cannot do, we
can describe them as involving “vicarious” affordances. Learning to see vicarious
affordances can be very important for adults whose children need help while they
learn ever more complex (and sometimes dangerous tasks), or for animals that
need to anticipate or constrain the behaviours of other animals in fighting with
them, attempting to catch and eat them, or attempting to avoid being eaten
by them. It need not be the case that perception of such vicarious affordances
has to be based on being able to use such affordances in one’s own actions. An
animal that needs to escape from a flying predator by choosing a appropriate
shelter need not itself ever have been a flying hunter.
In many animals, instead of an ability to perceive potential negative affor-
dances for predators and make use of them there is an inherited tendency to
react to predators by seeking shelter in appropriate locations, e.g. running into
burrows. In those animals the problem has been solved by evolution and a fixed
solution adopted. A more sophisticated animal might be able to choose between
two shelters by assessing their difficulty for the predator, as humans can do.
In more advanced cases, observation of the capabilities of a predator or enemy
can lead to a new design for a shelter that is deliberately built for the purpose,
as started happening after aircraft came into use in warfare in the 20th century,
and potential targets were either camouflaged or protected in bomb-proof shel-
ters. The use of black-outs during night bombing raids were an example where
people accepted conditions that removed their own affordances in order to reduce
the positive affordances for the enemy. It is an open research question whether
other animals can reason about vicarious affordances, though it seems that both
pre-verbal human children and some chimpanzees can perceive and react altru-
istically to affordances for others, as shown by [36].7 That research emphasises
questions about altruistic motivation, whereas I am drawing attention to the
representational and conceptual competences that make it possible to be both
helpful and unhelpful to others.
4.4 Evolutionary Significance of Independently Mobile Graspers
A feature of the ability to perceive and use affordances that is not often noted is
that there are commonalities between affordances related to doing things with
left hand, with right hand, with both hands, with teeth and with tools such as
tongs and pliers. Compare Figure 4. In principle it is possible that all the means
of grasping are represented in terms of features of the sensorimotor signals in-
volved, but the variety of such patterns is astronomical. Even using only one
hand, an object can be grasped in many different ways and because hands can
7 Videos are available at http://email.eva.mpg.de/∼warneken/video.htm
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Fig. 4. Four examples of grasping: two done by fingers, and two by a plastic
clip. In all cases, two 3-D surfaces move together, causing something to be held
between them, though retinal image projections and sensorimotor patterns in
each case are very different.
move independently of eyes, the variety of retinal projections produced by grasp-
ing processes is so great that having to learn all the relevant image structures
separately would be a mammoth task.
If, however, grasping is represented more abstractly, in terms of 3-D relations
between surfaces in space, using an amodal form of representation, using an
exosomatic ontology, i.e. referring to things outside the body instead of only
to sensorimotor signals, the variety of cases can be considerably reduced: for
instance very many types of grasping involve two surfaces moving together with
an object between them until contact is achieved, after which, if the surfaces
move together the object moves with them. Sub-cases of that general process-
pattern include different object weights and sizes, different kinds of surface (e.g.
rigid, compressible, smooth, rough, etc.), flat vs curved vs articulated grasping
surfaces, and so on. The most abstract representation can be used for high
level planning of actions involving grasping, including, for example, the common
requirement for the two grasping surfaces to be further apart during the approach
than the diameter of the thing to be grasped. More detailed information about
the specific case can then be used either when planning details, or during action
execution to control the detailed motion.
I suspect that biological evolution long ago “discovered” the enormous ad-
vantages of amodal, exosomatic, representations and ontologies as compared
with representations of patterns in sensorimotor signals. Since the 3-D process-
features described in the last paragraph are common to grasping with the left
hand, grasping with the right hand, grasping with two hands, grasping with the
mouth, and also grasping done by other individuals, enormous economy can be
achieved by directly representing the process that occurs in the environment,
rather than learning and storing myriad different relations between motor sig-
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nals that produce grasping, and sensor signals that result. The ability of infants
to transfer information about affordances from one hand or foot to another, and
the economy achieved by using more general forms of representation, is men-
tioned in [8], though they do not discuss the visual and cognitive mechanisms
and detailed forms of representation required.
There are also forms of grasping that are more complex than a process in
which two surfaces close in on something between them, for instance, grasping of
tools or implements for use in particular ways, such as holding a pen for writing,
a screwdriver for turning, a knife for cutting, a fork for prodding and lifting
food, a wooden ball for bowling, a pair of scissors for cutting, and a baby for
bathing or dressing. Those variants are not discussed in this paper, though the
perceptual, representational, and control requirements for each of them would
add significantly to the points made here.
Although 2-D image projections are often helpful for controlling the fine de-
tails of an action during visual servoing (as noted in [16]), using an exosomatic
ontology and representing the 3-D spatial structures and processes, rather than
using only somatic sensorimotor signal patterns, can make it possible for an indi-
vidual to learn about an affordance in one situation and transfer that learning to
another where sensor inputs and motor signals are quite different: e.g. discover-
ing the consequences of grasping an object with the right hand then transferring
what has been learned to other or observing grasping one by another individual
and then attempting to produce a similar spatial process.
The possibility of such transfer depends on a general ability to project 3-D
processes to possible sensory signals (e.g. working out what to look for when
grasping with the left hand for the first time), and to possible motor signals,
e.g. working out how to make the grasping happen in a new way. If there are
generic, re-usable, mappings between 3-D processes in the environment and sen-
sor and motor signal patterns, then concepts referring to abstract features of
environmental processes, and generalisations expressed using such concepts, will
be widely re-usable.
Using such a powerful form of representation makes it unnecessary to rely
on magical properties of “mirror neurones”, unless those neurones are simply
part of the brain’s mechanism for constructing and using amodal exosomatic
representations. Which evolved first will not be discussed here.
Another example may be the ease with which we can feel the shape of a
surface or the depth of a hole by stroking or poking with a firmly held stick
instead of relying on contact with fingers. Our brains have developed ways of
mapping different sensorimotor patterns into the same kinds of exosomatic rep-
resentations.
5 Towards a More General Visual Ontology
5.1 More on Proto-affordances
Both affordances for oneself and affordances for others depend on something
more fundamental: namely causal relationships that arise from structural rela-
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tionships between objects or parts of objects in the environment. In Section 4.2
we labelled these “proto-affordances”. An animal or machine that can perceive
and represent such relationships in the environment, may be able to make far
more predictions, explain far more phenomena, and plan far more solutions to
practical problems than one that is restricted to representing only information
about sensorimotor patterns, or information about its own present affordances
for action.
For example, if a ball is in the space between two vertical surfaces of large
rocks, the surfaces may prevent the ball moving horizontally in one direction
while allowing it to move horizontally in another direction – parallel to the
surfaces. If something is moving, and there is a large object in the path, then the
presence of that obstacle can prevent the indefinite continuation of the motion.
These possibilities for processes and constraints on possibilities for processes
exist and can be perceived independently of whether they are relevant to the
goals or actions of any perceiver.
We describe causal relationships between objects or parts of objects that
make some processes possible and others impossible as “proto-affordances”, since
they have the potential, in appropriate contexts, to be the basis for affordances
of animals or robots that might have goals or might attempt actions that would
be enabled or constrained by these causal relationships.
But a particular proto-affordance, such as the potential of one object to
impede the motion of another, can be the basis for a wide variety of action
affordances. E.g. it could produce a negative affordance for an agent trying to
push the moving object towards some remote location. It could provide a positive
affordance for some individual wishing to terminate the motion of a moving
object, e.g. a mother wishing to obstruct something rolling down a hill towards
her infants.
5.2 The Need for Generative Process Representations
An animal or a machine that can discover such proto-affordances, and has means
of representing them that allow manipulation of representations, may have the
ability to combine a given set of proto-affordances in different ways in order to
generate representations of a huge variety of affordances. An animal that can
only learn about and store information about positive and negative affordances
that it has already encountered will have a far more constrained understanding
of what can and cannot occur in the environment, and will be more limited in
its ability to think about entirely new processes and structures before it has ever
encountered them. This may be one of the main differences between humans and
most other animals. However, some non-human animals seem to show evidence
of creative problem solving that uses the ability to combine proto-affordances
to form new complex affordances. A particularly famous example was the New
Caledonian crow Betty, who seems to have invented several ways of transforming
a straight piece of wire into a hook in order to lift a bucket of food from a glass
tube [37].
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It is not known what forms of representation birds or other animals are
capable of using when perceiving or reasoning about 3-D processes and proto-
affordances. Anyone who tries making a rigid nest in a tree, by using only one
hand and adding only one twig at a time should develop a healthy respect for
the intelligence of certain nest-building birds.
Most AI vision researchers, and many psychologists assume that the sole
function of visual perception is acquiring information about which objects exist
in the environment, and what their properties and relationships are, whereas the
facts assembled here suggest that another major function of vision (at least in
humans, and probably several other species) is to acquire information from the
environment about what does not exist but could exist. Moreover, if the ability to
reason about consequences of possible processes uses the visual representations
involved in perceiving actual processes, then one of the functions of visual mech-
anisms is to do reasoning, presumably using GLs (Section 2.2). This conforms
with the experience of many mathematicians and scientists.
It is not clear how much of this ability to construct, manipulate and use
representations of actual and possible processes exists at birth (as the ability
to run with the herd exists in some mammals at birth) but that manipulative
ability certainly develops, as does the ability to see both what actually exists in
the environment and what is possible in any given situation. Examples of such
learning in human infants and children are presented in [8], although much of
the book focuses on how a child learns about affordances for itself and for others
rather than more general learning about properties of the environment.8
5.3 Complex Affordances: Combining Process Possibilities
One of the important things learnt by a child (or animal) exploring the environ-
ment by acting in it, is that affordances can be combined to form more complex
affordances. This depends on the fact that actions can be combined to form more
complex actions, which in turn depends on the more basic fact about the physi-
cal environment that processes can be combined to form more complex processes.
Reasoning about such complex processes in advance depends on the ability to
combine simpler proto-affordances to form more complex ones.
Because processes occur in space and time, and can have spatially and tem-
porally related parts, they can be combined in at least the following ways:
– processes occurring in sequence can form a more complex process;
– two processes can occur at the same time (e.g. two hands moving in opposite
directions);
– processes can overlap in time, e.g. the second starting before the first has
completed;
– processes can overlap in space, for example a chisel moving forwards into a
rotating piece of wood;
8 The developing ability of a child to see new kinds of things by growing an ontology is
discussed in more detail in an online presentation on “Evolution of ontology- exten-
sion”, at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#pr0604
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– one process can modify another, e.g. squeezing a rotating wheel can slow
down its rotation;
– one process can launch another, e.g. a foot kicking a ball.
The ability to represent a sequence of processes is part of the ability to form
plans prior to executing them. It is also part of the ability to predict future
events, and to explain past events, but this is just a special case of a more
general ability to combine proto-affordances. How is this done?
Both pre-verbal children and animals without human language seem to per-
ceive spatial structures and processes and to be able to do some reasoning about
spatial relations and processes, e.g. when they solve a problem for the first time.
Examples are reported in [36]. They are unlikely to be reasoning by means of a
human language, or a logical formalism.
5.4 Generative Forms of Representation
How do animal brains represent a wide variety of processes? Formal grammars
are capable of summarising infinitely varied classes of symbolic structures. A
grammar for sentences in a spoken language can generate a potentially infinite
variety of acoustic processes. There have also been various attempts to produce
systematic ways of generating and representing spatial structures. For example,
in the 1960s various researchers experimented with grammars for classes of pic-
tures. Later that was followed by work on classes of 3-D structures. One example
was the “geon” theory of Biederman, proposing (implausibly) that humans see
all 3-D structures as derivable from a small set of primitive objects that can
be deformed and combined in various ways [38]. Marr’s (1977) theory of 3-D
perception based on generalised cylinders was a variant on this sort of theory.
Others have proposed alternative ways of generating classes of 3-D structures.
[40], generalising earlier work by Huffman, Clowes and Waltz, report on mecha-
nisms for interpreting a wide variety of 2-D depictions of 3-D polyhedra. There
have been many experiments with schemes for generating classes of pictures of
plant-like, or animal-like shapes.
The demands on a system for representing spatial processes are greater than
demands on generative specifications of spatial structures. There are far more
processes that can occur in any environment than static structures, since each
structure can be moved or deformed in many ways (translating, rotating, stretch-
ing, compressing, shearing twisting, etc.) and any two structures can move in
relation to each other in many different ways. That extra complexity is not ex-
pressible just by adding an extra dimension to a vector, which suffices for the
move from 3-D to 4-D points. So a system that can represent, see, predict and
reason about processes will need to be far more complex than mechanisms for
coping with static 3-D structures.
The set of possible processes can be constrained by a context, but even
then the remaining set can be very large. There are many familiar human and
biological contexts that determine distinct vast and varied collections of possible
spatial processes, for example a child’s playroom, a kitchen, a group of people
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at a dinner table, a garden, a motorway, various situations in which birds build
nests, scenarios in which lions hunt their prey, a lion eating its prey (a collection
of processes that change their character as more of the animal has been opened
up and eaten), etc. A theory of how biological vision works must explain what
kinds of information about spatial processes particular animals are capable of
acquiring, how the information is represented, how it is used, how the ability to
acquire and use more kinds of information develops, and so on.
5.5 Generative Schemes for Spatial Processes
There are not many formal generative schemes for classes of spatial processes.
Newton’s laws characterise an infinite variety of possible motions of point masses
and larger structures. There have also been various attempts at dance notation.
Computer programming languages are powerful representations of processes, and
some of them are used to represent processes simulating 3-D physical processes.
But the representations have hitherto mostly been required for generating graph-
ical displays, and not for supporting perceptual and cognitive processes in a
perceiver of the simulated world.
I don’t know whether anyone has attempted to produce a generative scheme
for combinations of spatial processes that are likely to occur in the environment
inhabited by particular sorts of animals, or by a child in a particular culture. In
AI, symbolic planning formalisms have been in use since the 1950s, and these
provide a means of representing individual events in terms of preconditions and
postconditions. Complex and varied combinations of these event representations
allow processes to be represented consisting of sequences of events. The impor-
tance of such forms of representation was recognised very early, e.g. by [41].
However, discrete sequences are not enough: the notations used in such plan-
ning systems are not suitable for representing the many kinds of spatial process
that can occur in our environment in which features and relationships change
continuously, and changes occur concurrently at different levels of abstraction.
For example such planning formalisms cannot capture the process of wiping a
sink clean as perceived when someone actually does it, though the formalism will
work for an arbitrarily “chunked” summary of the process, e.g. pick up cloth;
wipe sink; rinse cloth!
It seems that in order to accommodate the variety of processes humans and
other animals can perceive and understand, they will need forms of representa-
tion that have the properties we ascribed to spatial GLs in Section 2.2, with the
benefits described in [23].
5.6 Varieties of Learning About Processes
In the first few years of life, a typical human child must learn to perceive and
to produce many hundreds of different sorts of spatial process, some involving
its own body, some involving movements of other humans and pets, and some
involving motion of inanimate objects, with various causes. Researchers are often
amazed at the speed with which young children extend their vocabulary, after
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they start talking. I suspect that if anyone ever finds a way to count the rate
at which a pre-verbal child extends its ontology and its ability to construct and
manipulate new representations in its mental virtual machine, we shall be even
more impressed.
This learning process almost certainly requires forms of representation and an
ontology that are not given at birth (as happens for the vast majority of animals)
but are built up in layers, where the processes in later layers can be both more
complex and more abstract than the processes represented in earlier layers, and
depend increasingly on the geographic, climatic and cultural influences on the
child’s environment.
For example, topological processes where contact relationships, containment
relationships, alignment relationships go into and out of existence are different
from metrical processes where things change continuously. Process representa-
tions restricted to changes of shape, size, and geometrical or topological inter-
actions between objects are not as rich as representations that refer to kinds of
material and their causal and functional roles, e.g. elasticity, rigidity, impene-
trability, stickiness, weight, etc.
Moreover, the very same physical process can include both metrical changes,
as something is lowered into or lifted out of a container and discrete topological
changes as contact, containment, or overlap relationships between objects and
spatial regions or volumes change.
5.7 Process-primitives and Compound Processes
In each context there are different sets of ‘primitive’ processes and different ways
in which processes can be combined to form more complex processes. Some sim-
ple examples in a child’s environment might include an object simultaneously
moving and rotating, where the rotation may be closely coupled to the trans-
lation, e.g. a ball rolling on a surface, or independent of the translation, e.g.
a frisbee spinning as it flies. Other closely coupled adjacent processes include:
A pair of meshed gear wheels rotating; a string unwinding as an axle turns;
a thread being pulled through cloth as a needle is lifted; a pair of laces being
tied together by a moving hands and fingers; a bolt simultaneously turning and
moving further into a nut or threaded hole; a sleeve sliding on an arm as the
arm is stretched; and sauce in a pan moving as a spoon moves round in it.
Many compound processes arise when a person or animal interacts with a
physical object. Compound 3-D processes are the basis of an enormous variety
of affordances. For example, an object may afford grasping, and lifting, and as
a result of that it may afford the possibility of being moved to a new location.
The combination of grasping, lifting and moving allows a goal to be achieved
by performing a compound action using the three affordances in sequence. The
grasping itself can be a complex process made of various successive sub-processes,
and some concurrent processes – for example concurrently changing relationships
between different parts of the surface of the object and different parts of the
grasping hand, as metrical and topological relationships change between:
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1. palm and fingers
2. the grasped object
3. the spatial envelope of the hand
4. the spatial envelope of the grasped object or object part.
It is often thought that the only significant result of making use of an af-
fordance is producing a physical change in the environment. But an immediate,
more abstract, consequence of a physical change is typically the existence of new
positive and negative affordances. The handle on a pan lid may afford lifting the
lid, but once the lid is lifted not only is there a new physical situation, there are
also new affordances: for pouring the contents of the pan, adding other things
to the pan, stirring the contents, seeing the state of the contents, etc. The last
example illustrates the fact that an action can alter the information available in
the environment, which is an epistemic affordance, just as the action of moving
closer to an open door (Figure 5) alters epistemic affordances.9
Fig. 5. As you move nearer the door you will have access to more information
about the contents of the room, and as you move further away you will have
less. Why? If you move left or right you will change the information available
to you. In all these cases, physical actions change the epistemic affordances in
a situation.
5.8 Reasoning About Interacting Spatial Processes
We have seen that processes that occur close together in space and time can
interact in a wide variety of ways, depending on the precise spatial and temporal
9 Further discussion of epistemic affordances and how they change can be found in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0702
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relationships. It is possible to learn empirically about the consequences of such
interactions by observing them happen, and either collecting statistics to support
future predictions, or formulating and testing universal generalisations. However,
humans and some other animals sometimes need to be able to consider and
work out consequences of possible combinations that they have never previously
observed, for example approaching a door that is shut, while carrying something
in both hands, for the first time. It does not take a genius to work out that an
elbow can be used to depress the handle while pushing to open the door.
[8] state on page 180 that the affordance of a tool can be discovered in only
two ways, by exploratory activities and by imitation. There are many unsolved
problems about what sorts of mechanism can extract and store re-usable infor-
mation about how to do something on the basis of observing either other people
performing actions or performing them oneself. However the most important
point in the present context is that a third way of discovering affordances was
not mentioned, namely working out what processes are possible when objects
are manipulated, and what their consequences will be.
A very strong requirement for human-like visual mechanisms is that they
should produce representations (e.g. GLs, if our theory is correct) that can be
used for reasoning about novel spatial configurations and novel combinations of
processes, which in humans seems often to involve the same kind of reasoning
as led to the study of Euclidean geometry long before the development of logic
and algebra as we know them. Likewise, young children can reason about spatial
processes and their implications long before they can do logic and algebra (as
Piaget realised) and to some extent even before they can talk. As remarked in
[22], this has implications for the evolution and development of language.
The requirement to be able to use information gained visually to reason
about the consequences of novel processes is an important example of the need
for designs to scale out, introduced earlier in Section 3.
I assume that by “exploratory activities” Gibson and Pick meant to refer
to physical exploration and play, interacting with objects in the environment,
including their own bodies. The missing “third way”, namely working things
out, can also involve exploratory activities, but the explorations can be done
with representations of the objects and processes instead of using the actual
physical objects. The representations used to explore possibilities can be entirely
mental, e.g. visualising what happens when some geometrical configuration is
transformed, or they can include diagrams or models, for instance 2-D pictures
representing 3-D structures, with processes represented by marks on the pictures
[23,33]. The biological advantages of being able to reason about future actions
have often been pointed out, e.g. by [42,43].
Although reasoning with representations in place of the objects can be fal-
lacious, and often is, nevertheless, when done rigorously, it is mathematical in-
ference rather than empirical inference. As documented at length in [44] the
methods of mathematics are far from infallible. But that does not make them
empirical in the same way as the methods of the physical sciences are. This
Architectural and Representational Requirements 31
claim is subtle and complex and will not be substantiated here. A more detailed
discussion can be found in the online presentation mentioned in Footnote 1.
The ability to think about and reason about novel combinations of familiar
types of process is often required for solving new problems, for example realising
for the first time that instead of going from A to B and then to C it is possible
to take a short cut from A to C, or realising that a rigid circular disc can serve
as well as something long and thin (like a screwdriver) to lever something up, or
realising for the first time that a pair of long cylinders placed under a large box
can make the box easier to move along a flat surface, though the cylinders will
repeatedly have to be moved from the back of the pushed object to the front, as
the motion proceeds.
The majority of work on reasoning in AI makes use of forms of represen-
tation that are close to logic and algebra, namely what were called “Fregean”
representations in [23], because, as Frege was the first to note, they all use the
function-argument syntactic form. However, humans, and possibly some other
animals have the ability to visualise things changing and can use visualisation to
work out consequences of processes. That was described as reasoning with “ana-
logical” representations in the 1971 paper. [45] makes a very similar distinction,
though he compares analogical representations with Fregean ones thus “What is
a relation in one system may be a part, or an element, in the other.”
5.9 Creative Reasoning About Processes and Affordances
[8] mention various kinds of “prospectivity” that develop in children but they
focus only on empirically learnt kinds of predictive rules, and ignore the child’s
growing ability to design and represent novel complex multi-stage processes that
can achieve some goal. Such prospectivity involves working out what will happen
if something is done, instead of merely using a learnt correlation or imitating an
observed action.
The ability to work things out is facilitated and enhanced by the ability
to form verbal descriptions, as in inventing stories, but linguistic competence
is not a prerequisite for the ability, as can be seen in the creative problem-
solving of pre-verbal children and some other animals. Human children, and
some other animals, seem to be able to work out the consequences of some
actions using geometric and topological reasoning – an ability also required for
doing some kinds of mathematics, e.g. proving theorems in Euclidean geometry.
Before doing mathematics explicitly, children need to develop a kind of visual and
manipulative fluency regarding spatial structures, relationships and processes
that is built up by playing with many different examples. [33] present examples
of activities that can help young children to develop their understanding of
topological structures and processes. If we can produce a theory of what the
information-processing mechanisms are that make that possible we may be in a
much better position to design such educational games and toys.
As illustrated in Figure 6, affordances can interact in complex ways when
combined, because of the changing spatial relationships of objects during the
processes of performing the actions. A large chair may afford lifting and carrying
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Fig. 6. A person trying to move a chair that is too wide to fit through a door can
work out how to move it through the door by combining a collection of translations
and 3-D rotations about different axes, some done in parallel, some in sequence.
Traditional AI planners cannot construct plans involving continuous interacting
actions.
from one place to another, and a doorway may afford passage from one room to
another. But the attempt to combine the two affordances by lifting and carrying
the chair to the next room may fail when the plan is tried, e.g. if it is found
during the process of execution that the chair is too wide to fit through the
doorway.
A very young child may not be able to do anything about that, but an older
child who has learnt to perceive the possibility of rotation of a 3-D object, may
realise that a combination of small rotations about different axes combined with
small translations can form a compound process that results in the chair getting
through the doorway. (Is any other type of animal capable of working that out?)
At an early stage the child may merely be able to do this one step at a time:
seeing the possibility of the first rotation, then, after performing the rotation,
seeing the possibility of forward motion, which is soon obstructed. Then another
rotation may be tried followed by another translation to achieve the final goal.
At a later stage the child may be able to see the possibility of the whole sequence
of actions by visualising in advance the situation that will arise after each step.
After searching in imagination through a set of possible action sequences the
child may be able to work out by visual reasoning how to move the chair into
the next room, and then do it. Although that description will be understood
intuitively by most readers, it is not at all clear what sort of brain mechanism
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or computer mechanism can perform that reasoning function or achieve that
learning.
If that is done often, the whole process may be learnt as a re-usable pattern
for moving large objects that can be made to fit a variety of specific cases,
without having to be re-discovered every time.
That learning requires some abstract, possibly parametrised, representation
of the process to be created, stored in a re-usable form, and integrated with some
kind of indexing mechanism that allows its relevance to be recognised when new
related problems are encountered, so that the whole design process does not need
to be repeated each time.
It is also possible to learn to separate complex affordances that have positive
and negative aspects into components so as to retain only the positive aspects.
This is a type of process “de-bugging” that children and adults often have to do,
though many politicians ignore the need when designing policies. A colleague
reported to me that his child had learnt that open drawers could be closed by
pushing them shut. The easiest way to do that was to curl his fingers over the
upper edge of the projecting drawer and push, as he would push other objects.
The resulting pain led him to discover that the pushing could be made slightly
less convenient by flattening his hand when pushing, so as to produce the desired
result without the unwanted side effects.
It is important to notice the difference between merely discovering empirically
that using a flat hand avoids the painful result (and achieves a completely shut
drawer) and seeing why that is so. This requires understanding consequences of
actions in which the gap between two surfaces is reduced while there is something
between the surfaces.10 Being able to do geometrical reasoning enables a child
who is old enough to work out why pushing with a flat hand prevents fingers
being caught between the two surfaces. Such a child could also work out that
if the drawer is recessed and the front of the chest juts out immediately above
the drawer, it will be necessary to make sure that the flat hand does not project
above the edge of the drawer in the last stages of pushing.
5.10 The Need for Explanatory Theories
It is clear that many humans can perform such reasoning by visualising processes
in advance of producing them, but it is not at all clear what representations are
used to manipulate information about the shapes and affordances of the objects
involved. A shallow answer (at least as old as Craik’s book) is that we build
internal models of the environment and manipulate them in order to discover
the consequences. But this leaves open the question what such a model could
be. If the model has too much in common with the things in the environment
then the internal model cannot be part of the explanation of how the external
processes are perceived and controlled.




It is often thought that such a predictive model must be isomorphic with
what it represents. An internal model that is isomorphic with the environment
would lack appropriate explanatory power, since it would shift our problem to the
problem of explaining how the person (or a “homunculus” perceiving the model),
could work out what to do with it. Crude explanations in terms of internal models
simply produce an infinite regress. The requirements for adequate theories are
discussed in more detail in Section 6 below.
The lack of a suitable theory about how spatial structures and processes can
be represented means that we cannot yet give a similar range of capabilities to
robots, although a noteworthy early effort at giving a machine the ability to
reason spatially (only in 2-D) about actions in the environment was Funt’s PhD
(1977).
Although there has been much work on giving machines with video cameras
or laser scanners the ability to construct representations of 3-D structures and
processes that can be projected onto a screen to show pictures or videos from
different viewpoints, we still lack the ability to give robots spatial representation
capabilities that are usable for other purposes such as manipulating objects,
planning manipulations, and reasoning about them, except in very simple cases,
for instance motions of objects that do not touch one another, or motions of
objects that are all rigid and have simple shapes, e.g. moving cylinders or cubes.
AI planning systems developed in the 1960s as exemplified in the STRIPS
planner [46] and more complex recent planners (surveyed in [47]) all make use
of the fact that knowledge about affordances can be abstracted into reusable
information about the preconditions and effects of actions. Once that is done, it
provides a new kind of cognitive affordance: concerned with acting on informa-
tion structures. That early AI work demonstrated the possibility of combining
knowledge about simple actions to provide information about complex actions
composed of simple actions.
However, STRIPS and its successors assume that the information about ac-
tions and affordances can be expressed in terms of implications between propo-
sitions expressed in a logical formalism. The planning process searches for a
sequence (or partially ordered network) of discrete actions that will transform
the initial problem state into the desired goal state. But we need a richer mech-
anism to handle actions that involve interactions between continuous processes,
like the changes that occur while an arm-chair is being rotated and translated
simultaneously, or while a sink is being wiped clean with a cloth.
5.11 Seeing Logical Relationships
Consider an argument like
All computers consume energy
Fred is using a computer,
Therefore
Fred is using something that consumes energy
When normally sighted people do logic or algebra they use the ability to see
structural relationships between formulae: a kind of geometrical competence.
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For example, detecting the logical validity of the above argument depends on
noticing that there are structural relations between parts of the argument. People
can learn to recognise such groups of sentences as instances of a spatial pattern,
such as this:
All Ps are Qs
A is using a P
Therefore
A is using a Q
where “A”, “P”, and “Q” are variables capable of being replaced by a referring
expression and two predicate expressions, respectively, to produce different in-
stances. A still more general expression could be formed by replacing “is using”
with a relation variable.
The examples in previous sections concerned acquiring and using informa-
tion about what sorts of changes can and cannot occur in a physical situation.
Something similar can occur when the ability is applied not to solid movable ob-
jects in the environment, but to patterns that can be perceived on the surfaces
of objects, such as symbols drawn in the sand, or on paper representing logical
structures.
Although humans normally check the structure of such reasoning using vision,
there are other ways to check such an inference: a computer running the language
Prolog may do it by performing the “resolution” operation on computer data-
structures, i.e. matching two structures and linking variables in one to parts of
the other. So the same reasoning process may be implemented in different sorts
of mechanisms – including both visual and logical mechanisms.
At my first AI conference, in 1971, I challenged the then AI orthodoxy by
arguing that intelligent machines would need to be able to reason geometrically
as well as logically, and that some reasoning with diagrams should be regarded
as being valid and rigorous, and in some cases far more efficient than reasoning
using logic, because logical representations are topic-neutral and sometimes lose
some of the domain structure that can be used in searching for proofs.
But it soon became clear that, although many people had independently
concluded that AI techniques needed to be extended using spatial reasoning
techniques, neither I nor anyone else knew how to design machines with the
right kinds of abilities, even though there were many people working on giving
machines the ability to recognise, analyse and manipulate images, or parts of
images, often represented as 2-D rectangular arrays, though sometimes in other
forms, e.g. using log-polar coordinates, e.g. [24]. Other examples were presented
in [25]. More recent examples are [48,49].
5.12 An Objection: Blind Mathematicians
It could be argued that the description of mathematical reasoning as “visual”
must be wrong because people who have been blind from birth can reason about
shapes and do logic and mathematics even though they cannot see.11 That argu-
11 E.g. [50] reports on a number of blind mathematicians.
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ment ignores the fact that some of the visual apparatus produced by evolution to
support seeing and reasoning about structures and processes in the environment
is in brain mechanisms that perform some of their functions without optical in-
put: like the normal ability to see what can change in a situation when those
changes are not occurring, or the ability to visualise a future sequence of actions
that are not now being performed, and therefore cannot produce retinal input.
Moreover, since the same 3-D situation can generate infinitely many views, it
would be explosively expensive to represent a recurring 3-D situation in terms of
corresponding retinal contents, so it is possible that some biological organisms,
including humans, have the ability to represent the environment using amodal,
non-retinotopic forms of representation whose registration with the optic array
changes across saccades and other physical movements (as discussed in [51,52]).
Such a representation could also be linked to tactile and haptic information even
if it originally evolved under pressure to cope with the vast amount of near and
far scene information provided in parallel through vision. So people who have
been blind from birth may still be using the bulk of the visual system that evolved
in their ancestors, just as sighted people may be using it when they dream about
seeing things, and when they visualise diagrams with their eyes shut. However,
the process of learning about the specific spatial structures and processes in the
environment must be very different for blind people. The learning processes are
different in a different way for individuals born with other disabilities, e.g. with
missing limbs, or with faulty physical control mechanisms as in cerebral palsy.
The fact that many such individuals acquire a common humanity via different
routes is an indication of how much of human mentality is independent of our
specific form of embodiment. That is probably not true of all species, though
many are highly adaptable if injured.
5.13 Use of Abstraction Is Not Metaphor
The claim that visual mechanisms using abstract patterns can support reasoning
of the sort done in mathematics should not be confused with the common claim
that spatial concepts are used as metaphors for non-spatial topics, for instance
the claim that we must use spatial metaphors in thinking about numbers or
about time. Such claims are based on a failure to understand that there are high
level domain-neutral concepts (e.g. “order”, “between”, “more than”, “is a subset
of”) which are equally applicable to many different domains for example because
all those domains have some common topological features. Points on a line, times
in a temporal interval, and any set of integers all form total orderings, and both
can be divided into ordered subsets in many different ways. Seeing that there
is an abstract, generally applicable, pattern, is different from seeing structural
mappings between partly similar instances.
An animal or machine that can abstract the possibility of joining a vertex
of a triangle to the middle of the opposite side (see Section 3.5) from instances
of that process, and can form a pattern that is applicable to all triangles, past
and future, is doing something different from creating a single such triangle with
such a line drawn on it and mapping parts of it on to other triangles in order to
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modify them in the same way. Observing the commonality between modifications
of two specific triangles may trigger the discovery of the general pattern, but if
the general pattern has not been understood as a re-usable pattern with many
instances, then each new instance of a triangle has to be separately tested for
the possibility of being part of a process that can be mapped onto the original
model.
Using manipulable structures in one domain to represent patterns in another
domain for the purpose of reasoning about them, because both domains share
some features (without necessarily being isomorphic), is a different matter from
using the first domain as a metaphor for the second domain: metaphors do not
provide valid inferences, although they are often usefully suggestive.
These ideas are not new: Several famous examples of visual proofs are pre-
sented in [53]. Many theorists, including great logicians such as Frege (see [54])
and mathematicians such as [55], have pointed at the use of visualisation and
spatial reasoning capabilities in mathematics and logic. It will be clear from ear-
lier comments about exosomatic ontologies and representations in Section 4 that
I do not agree with Poincare´’s claim “But every one knows that this perception
of the third dimension reduces to a sense of the effort of accommodation which
must be made, and to a sense of the convergence of the two eyes, that must take
place in order to perceive an object, distinctly. These are muscular sensations
quite different from the visual sensations which have given us the concept of the
two first dimensions.” I suspect he would have modified his views if he had been
involved in designing robots that can perceive and reason about 3-D scenes.
However, I am not aware of work that spells out detailed engineering require-
ments for a working visual system capable of being used for mathematical visual
reasoning, or work that proposes a design that can meet those requirements,
although a few special cases have been partly modelled in AI programs, fairly
recent examples being [48,49]. A partial set of requirements for such a system is
in a presentation mentioned in Footnote 1.
6 Studying Mechanisms vs. Studying Requirements.
6.1 The Importance of Requirements
It has gradually become clear that finding suitable explanatory mechanisms is
only one part of the problem of studying minds, including studying vision. Less
obvious than the need to find mechanisms is the need to clarify precisely what
the mechanisms are needed for. It is not very difficult to specify hundreds of
different algorithms for analysing, comparing or transforming images or parts of
images represented as 2-D arrays – as was done, for example, in the 1960s, in
Azriel Rosenfeld’s research group in Maryland [56]12 – but not so easy to specify
what the high level requirements are that determine what sorts of algorithm
12 It is worth remembering that in those days computers ran millions of times more
slowly than now, and memories were measured in kilobytes not gigabytes, so that
things that are trivial now were monumental achievements then.
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and what forms of representation are needed for modelling or replicating human
visual abilities, including the ability to reason visually.
Engineers are accustomed to distinguishing specifying requirements from
specifying a design. The requirements can guide the search for designs, in ad-
dition to providing criteria for evaluating designs. However, we still have no
comprehensive generally agreed inventory of the capabilities that need to be
modelled and explained in an artificial, human-like visual system, although there
are many fragmentary requirements studied by different researchers in psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, AI, education, history of art [57], etc. This paper adds more
fragments to the collection but does not claim completeness.
Unfortunately, AI researchers (and other modellers) too often launch into
seeking designs, on the assumption that the requirements are clear, e.g. because
they think everyone knows what a visual system has to be able to do, or be-
cause they deliberately focus on a very narrow set of requirements defined by
behaviours observed in psychology experiments, or requirements defined by some
benchmark test, such as recognition of objects in a collection of images. There
is nothing intrinsically wrong with such research, but it can lead researchers
(and their students) to ignore the question of what else needs to be explained in
addition to those behaviours. Moreover, as already remarked, successful models
or explanations of a limited set of behaviours may not scale out.
A deeper problem, is that there is as yet not even a generally agreed ontology
for discussing requirements and designs. That is we do not have an agreed set
of concepts for describing cognitive functions in great detail, with sufficient pre-
cision to be used in specifying requirements for testable working systems. (For
example, how would you decide whether a robot really is visualising a route, or
merely constructing and manipulating a data-structure representing that route?)
6.2 Mistaken Requirements
Section 5 of [34], entitled “Previous false starts”, presents a list of nine fairly
common mistaken assumptions about how vision systems should work. Much
of this paper is implicitly an extension of that list. For example it is tempting
to suppose that a requirement for 3-D vision mechanisms is that they must
construct a 3-D model of the perceived scene, with the components arranged
within the model isomorphically with the relationships in the scene. This is in
fact how some AI vision systems work, for instance in robots that move around
using laser range-finders to create a model of all the visible surfaces in the
environment. Such a model can be used to generate graphical displays showing
the appearance of the environment from different viewpoints. However, Figure 7
shows that we are able to see a complex structure without building such a model,
for there cannot be a model of an impossible scene.
An alternative hypothesis is that what a visual system needs to do is con-
struct a large collection of fragments of information of various sorts about sur-
faces, objects, relationships, possible changes and constraints on changes in the
scene (including positive and negative affordances), with most of the informa-
tion fragments represented at least approximately in registration with the optic
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Fig. 7. This figure (after a drawing by Oscar Reutersva¨rd in 1934) has many
components that can be interpreted as representing parts of a 3-D scene, with
a wide variety of affordances, e.g. possible ways of moving the individual cubes,
or ways of inserting something into the gaps between the cubes. Yet the whole
scene, made up of all the fragments with the depicted relationships and locally
consistent affordances, is geometrically impossible. This shows that seeing the
scene depicted here cannot involve constructing a model isomorphic with the
whole scene, since no such model can exist.
array, though in an amodal form, insofar as they refer to entities that are not all
currently visible, or use a 3-D ontology and have the potential to be linked to
control of actions or to be matched against different sorts of sensory information.
This form of representation, which could include spatial GLs (Sec. 2.2), can be
thought of as a generalisation of generalised aspect-graphs.
The idea of an aspect-graph has probably been reinvented several times using
different labels. For instance, in [58] they were called “frame systems”. The core
idea is that a 3-D object will present distinct 2-D views which can be linked
to form a graph where the edges of the graph represent actions that a viewer
can perform, such as moving left, or right or up or down. These actions are
associated with both continuous changes in the 2-D view (e.g. relative lengths of
lines and sizes of angles changing) and also discontinuous changes, e.g. an edge
or face disappearing or coming into view. This seems to be the same idea as
Kant discussed in [2] in connection with different views presented by the same
house as you move around it or move up or down within it. This idea can be
generalised so that more actions are included, such as touching or pushing, or
grasping an object and more changes are produced such as two objects coming
together or moving apart, or an object rotating, or sliding or tilting, or becoming
unstable, etc,
An animal or robot that does not have a good representation of the 3-D struc-
tures, relationships and processes involved will have to build up many generalised
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aspect graphs empirically, using myriad viewpoints, different ways of perform-
ing the same action, etc., in order to learn all the relevant mappings between
sensorimotor signals and the resulting sensorimotor signals. However if a repre-
sentation of the relevant 3-D structures and processes is available, along with
mechanisms that are able to work out geometric and topological consequences of
changing relationships, that can be used to derive consequences that have never
been experienced before, e.g. the result of performing an action with your left
hand on a green triangular block of a particular size for the first time. For this
reason, we need to understand the differences between somatic and exosomatic
ontologies and representations, where the former are concerned with patterns
(at various levels of abstraction) in sets of sensory and motor signals and the
latter are concerned with entities in the environment that exist independently
of anything perceiving or acting on them. Somatic, sensorimotor ontologies refer
to things that can only exist in the body of an animal or robot. A great deal
of current research in vision and robotics focuses on mechanisms that manip-
ulate only representations of sensorimotor phenomena, e.g. statistical patterns
relating multi-modal sensor and motor signals, whereas one of the main claims
of this paper is that human-like systems need, in addition, amodal exosomatic
ontologies and forms of representation suited to them. Their great advantage is
that a single representation of a process can in the environment, such as two
fingers grasping a berry, can ignore all the variations in sensor and motor signals
that depend on precisely how the grasping is done and the viewpoint from which
the process is observed, and which other objects may partially occlude relevant
surfaces.
6.3 Is Consistency-checking Required?
Of course, this ability to acquire such general, reusable forms of representation,
requires the perceiver to be able to take in visual (and possibly haptic and tactile)
sensory input and construct a representation of the 3-D structure in the scene
(as opposed to only representations of the appearances). If that representation
of the 3-D scene is made up of many piecemeal representations of fragments of
the scene and the possible effects of processes involving those fragments, then
in principle those fragments could form an inconsistent totality as shown in
Figure 7. So it would seem that an intelligent robot or animal must constantly
check whether it has consistent percepts.
However, since no portion of the 3-D environment is capable of containing
impossible objects, there is normally no need for such a visual system to check
that all the derived information is consistent, except in order to eliminate ambi-
guities. This is just as well since in general consistency checking is an intractable
process, which scales exponentially with the number of items to be checked.
Humans can learn to check consistency, at least in some contexts, and that
enables them to see that the configuration of cubes depicted in the figure is
impossible. However a very young child will not notice the impossibility, and
even an adult might not notice the impossibility if a picture of an impossible
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scene contains a large number of objects arranged not in an triangle but in a
more complex configuration.
6.4 Obvious and Unobvious Requirements: Ontological Blindness
Many people, e.g. [59], have noticed the need for hierarchical decomposition of
complex perceived objects and the usefulness of a mixture of top down, bottom
up and middle out processing in perception of such objects. A recent example of
a visual learning system that automatically acquires a layered network of image
features as a result of being exposed to a collection of pictures showing objects
that the system learns to recognise is [60].
What is not so often noticed is that in addition to part-whole hierarchies there
are also ontological layers, as illustrated in the Popeye program13 described in
Chapter 9 of [32]. The program was presented with images made of dots in a
rectangular grid, such as Figure 8, which it analysed and interpreted in terms
of:
– a layer of dot configurations (which could, for example, contain collections
of collinear adjacent dots);
– a layer of line configurations, where lines are interpretations of “noisy” sets of
collinear dots, and can form configurations such parallel pairs, and junctions
of various sorts;
– a layer of 2-D overlapping, opaque ‘plates’ with straight sides and rectangular
corners, which in Popeye were restricted to the shapes of cut-out capital
letters, such as “A”, “E”, “F”, “H” etc. represented in a noisy fashion by
collections of straight line segments;
– a layer of sequences of capital letters represented by the plates, also in a
“noisy” fashion because the plates could be jumbled together with overlaps;
– a layer of words, represented by the letter sequences.
The Popeye program illustrated the need for some visual systems to use on-
tologies at different levels of abstraction processed concurrently, using a mixture
of top-down, bottom-up and middle-out processing, where lower levels are not
parts of the higher levels but rather represent the higher levels.
At each ontological layer there are part-whole hierarchies. E.g. a complex
group of dots may be made of smaller groups of dots. Going from one ontological
layer to another is not a matter of grouping parts into a whole, but interpreting
one sort of structure as representing another, for instance, interpreting config-
urations of dots as representing configurations lines. A complex configuration
of lines could be made of simpler configurations, which are ultimately made of
line-segments. Configurations of lines can be interpreted as representing overlap-
ping 2-D plates. A complex opaque plate (e.g. the plate representing the “E” in
Figure 8) could be made of smaller, simpler rectangular plates. In this situation
13 So-called because it was implemented in the Edinburgh University AI programming
language POP-2.
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Fig. 8. This is a typical example of a configuration of dots presented to the
Popeye program in Chapter 9 of Sloman (1978), which attempted to find a known
word by concurrently looking for structures in several ontological layers, with
a mixture of top-down, bottom-up and middle-out influences. If the noise and
clutter were not too bad, the program, like humans could detect the word before
identifying all the letters and their parts. It also degraded gracefully as noise and
clutter made the problem harder.
a dot may be a part of a row of dots, but it is not a part of a plate or letter or a
word, though it is part of something that may represent plates letters or words.
The same letters and words can be represented in different ways, e.g. using
different fonts, and different conventions for projecting fonts into 2-D config-
urations. For example, in one place a word may be represented using outline
letters, and in another place using filled letters, though Popeye could not handle
that. Popeye could handle overlapping letters, though most other text-reading
programs do not allow the notion of overlap and would fail on these pictures,
unlike humans.
Text represented using several ontological layers may be regarded as a very
contrived example, but similar comments about ontological layers can be made
when a working machine is perceived, such as the internals of an old fashioned
clock. There will be sensory layers concerned with changing patterns of varying
complexity in the optic array. A perceiver will have to interpret those changing
sensory patterns as representing 3-D surfaces and their relationships, some of
which change over time. At a higher level of abstraction there are functional
categories of objects, e.g. levers, gears, pulleys, axles, strings, and various more
or less complex clusters of such objects, such as escapement mechanisms.
The ability to perceive the operation of a complex machine may have to use
an ontology including different kinds of substance, for instance both rigid parts,
flexible elastic strings or springs, flexible chains with weights on the end, whose
density needs to be high. At a still higher level of abstraction there are causal
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and functional roles, such as providing energy to drive the machine, transmitting
energy from one part to another, and in some kinds of engine mechanisms for
varying the torque and controlling speed either by modifying the energy source
or by applying brakes, etc.
There are many vision researchers who appreciate the need for a vision system
to move between a 2-D ontology and a 3-D ontology. For a recent survey see
[61]. The need for such layers will be evident to anyone who works on vision-
based text-understanding. However it is rare to include as many ontological
categories, in different layers as I claim are needed by an intelligent human-like
agent interacting with a 3-D environment, or to relate those layers to different
processing layers in the central architecture as explained in [62].
6.5 Different Uses of 3-D Information
Another subtle issue is the need to contrast merely requiring information about 3-
D structure (e.g. “amodal completion” of perceived volumes) with specifying that
the information needs to be represented so that it can be used in a certain way.
Representation of information for the purposes of recognition involves different
requirements from the representations that can be used for projecting images
from different viewpoints, for servo-control of manipulation, for planning future
actions, or for understanding how something works. The need for representations
to be usable for diverse applications is another example of the problem of “scaling
out”, mentioned in Section 3.
Perception of intelligent agents in the environment involves yet another level
of abstraction, insofar as some perceived movements are interpreted as actions
with purposes. For instance a hand moving towards a cup might be seen as
intentional, whereas changing patterns of wrinkles on a sleeve, or motion of
shadows might be seen as unintended side-effects.
6.6 Seeing Mental States
Moreover, if eyes and face are visible, humans will often see not just actions
but also mental states, such as focus of attention in a certain direction, puz-
zlement, worry, relief, happiness, sadness, and so on. Insofar as these are all
seen rather than inferred in some non-visual formalism, the percepts will be at
least approximately in registration with the optic array. Happiness is seen in
one face and not in another. The requirement for perceptual mechanisms to use
an ontological layer that includes mental states raises many problems that will
not be discussed here, for example the need to be able to cope with referen-
tial opacity. Representing something that is itself an information user requires
meta-semantic competences. These subtleties are ignored by researchers who
train computer programs to label pictures of faces using words such as “happy”,
“angry”, and claim that their programs can recognise emotional states.
The ability to perceive some processes as intentional actions produced by
other agents with mental states, including desires and beliefs probably had to
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evolve (and has to develop in children or robots) before the ability to produce
and understand intentional communications.
The need for ontological layers to be used in perceptual processing was no-
ticed long ago in connection with natural language understanding, which in-
volves, for example, phonemic, morphemic, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic
layers. So, since one of the uses of vision is reading written language, it should
have been obvious that visual perception also requires ontological layers: but
that fact has been generally ignored by vision researchers, except in those cases
where the distinction between the 2-D ontology of images and the 3-D ontol-
ogy of scenes has been noticed. The point being made here is that those two
ontological layers do not suffice for the full variety of human and animal visual
perception. We need to add several more layers including: 2-D and 3-D pro-
cesses, causal relations, functional relations, actions, mental states of perceived
agents, social phenomena, and all the forms of perception that differ from one
adult specialisation to another, e.g. in athletics, hunting animals, various kinds
of craft, engineering, scientific research, etc.
Figure 8 shows that even within the set of 2-D phenomena that play a role
in visual perception, there are different ontological levels, that are relevant to
different cognitive sub-functions. For instance, painters, unlike sculptors, have
to learn to ignore what they know about the 3-D structures they see and attend
to the 2-D relations features and relationships to be depicted in drawings and
paintings, some related to edges, some to surface markings, some to shading,
some to surface curvature, and so on.
6.7 Perceiving 2-D Processes in the Optic Array
2-D processes involving changes in the optic array are also important, as J.J.
Gibson pointed out. As noted in [16], apart from perception of static scenes,
vision is also required for online control of continuous actions (visual servoing)
which requires different forms of representation from those required for percep-
tion of structures to be described, remembered, used in planning actions, etc.
Sometimes a 2-D projection is more useful than a 3-D description for the
control problem, as it may be simpler and quicker to compute, and can suffice
for particular task, such as steering a vehicle through a gap.
But it is a mistake to think that only continuously varying percepts are
involved in online visual control of actions: there is also checking whether goals
or sub-goals have been achieved, whether the conditions for future processes have
not been violated, whether new obstacles or new opportunities have turned up,
and so on. Those can involve checking discrete conditions.
Unfortunately research on ventral and dorsal streams of neural processing has
led some researchers (e.g. [63]) to assume that control of action is separate from
cognition, or worse, that spatial perception (“where things are”) is a completely
separate function from categorisation (“what things are”), apparently ignoring
the fact that what an object is may depend on where its parts are in relation to
one another, or where it is located in a larger whole.
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6.8 Structures and Processes
A major theme that pervades engineering design and especially software design is
the relationship between structure and process. But the more general relevance of
this theme is not always noticed. For instance, doing school Euclidean geometry
involves seeing how a particular structure can be the starting point for various
processes, and seeing how processes of construction can produce new structures
from old ones, e.g. in proving theorems, such as Pythagoras’ theorem.
Some processes transform structures discretely, e.g. by changing the topology
of something (adding a new line to a diagram, separating two parts of an object,
altering contact or containment relations) others continuously (e.g. painting a
wall, pushing or lifting an object, or blowing up a balloon).
Understanding how an old-fashioned clock works involves seeing causal con-
nections and constraints related to possible processes that can occur in the mech-
anism.
Performing many actions involves doing several things concurrently, e.g. (a)
producing processes (e.g. grasping), (b) seeing those processes, and (c) using
visual servoing to control the fine details, (d) predicting future processes. Some
or all of this may be done unconsciously, as in posture control and many skilled
performances. (Such unconscious use of expertise does not make the actions
unintentional.)
Another theme that has been evident for many decades is the fact that per-
cepts can involve hierarchical structure, although not all the structures should
be thought of as loop-free trees like parse-trees. Seeing a bicycle, or even a sim-
ple closed polygon, requires use of a graph rather than a tree, though to a first
approximation most animals and plants have a tree-like structure (e.g. decom-
position into parts that are decomposed into parts, etc.)
6.9 Layered Ontologies
We have seen, in Section 6.4, that in addition to part-whole decomposition, per-
ception can use layered ontologies. For example, one sub-ontology might consist
entirely of 2-D image structures and processes, whereas another includes 3-D
spatial structures and processes, and another kinds of ‘stuff’ of which objects
are made and their properties (e.g. rigidity, elasticity, solubility, thermal con-
ductivity, etc.), to which can be added mental states and processes, e.g. seeing
a person as happy or sad, or as intently watching a crawling insect.
The use of multiple ontologies is even more obvious when what is seen is
text, or sheet music, perceived using different geometric, syntactic, and semantic
ontologies.
What did not strike me until 2005 when I was working on an EU-funded robot
project (CoSy) is what follows from the combination of the two themes (a) the
content of what is seen is often processes and process-related affordances, and
(b) the content of what is seen involves both hierarchical structure and multiple
ontologies. These themes together imply a set of requirements for a visual system
that makes current working models seem very far from what we need either in
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order to understand human and animal vision, or in order to produce working
models for scientific or engineering purposes.
Very many people are now working on how to cope with the fact that digital
camera technology, occlusion of one object by another, poor lighting, confusing
colours and textures, intervening fog or dirty windows, and other common oc-
currences leads to pervasive problems of noise and ambiguity that have to be
accounted for. This has led to a lot of research on mechanisms for represent-
ing and manipulating uncertainty, for instance propagating inferences based on
noisy and ambiguous low level information.
What is not always noticed is that a consequence of use of layered ontologies
is that humans have ways of seeing high level structures and processes whose
descriptions are impervious to the low level uncertainties: you can see that there
definitely is a person walking away from you on your side of the road and another
walking in the opposite direction on the other side of the road, even though you
cannot tell the precise locations, velocities, accelerations, sizes, orientations and
other features of the people and their hands, feet, arms, legs, etc. The latter
information may be totally irrelevant for your current purposes (looking to see
whether any cars are coming, before you cross the road).
Is it possible that the processes of dealing with uncertainty could be made far
more efficient and much simpler if they were ignored for a while and some effort
put into the problem of finding the determinate, certain, higher level informa-
tion first and then adding the uncertain details constrained by what is already
certain? Of course, finding ontologies, forms of representation. and mechanisms
to perform those high level tasks may be very difficult.
Some notes on this can be found in this discussion paper on predicting af-
fordance changes, including both action affordances and epistemic affordances:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0702
6.10 Seeing is Prior to Recognising
Much research on visual perception considers only one of the functions of per-
ception, namely recognition. It is often forgotten that there are many things we
can see that we cannot recognise or label, and indeed that is a precondition for
learning to categorise things.
When you see a complex new object that you do not recognise you may see
a great deal of 3-D structure, which includes recognising many types of surface
fragment, including flat parts, curved parts, changes of curvature, bumps, ridges,
grooves, holes, discontinuous curves where two curved parts meet, and many
more. In addition to many surface fragments, many of their relationships are
also seen.
Not only are relationships within objects important, but also relationships
between objects, and also between different parts of objects. When someone is
seen to grasp something manually, there are many different configurations that
can be involved in grasping the same object, depending on how different parts of
the hand are related to different parts of the grasped object. For many years my
own work on vision (e.g in the Popeye project) assumed that perception involves
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perception of structure at different levels of abstraction, although the need to
perceive and control processes during continuous visual servoing was mentioned
in [16]. However, it was not until working on requirements for a robot that can
manipulate 3-D objects in 2005 that I realised that it is also necessary to be able
to see processes at different levels of abstraction, as explained with a number of
examples in this online presentation: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/
projects/cosy/papers/#pr0505.
6.11 Seeing Processes
Biological considerations suggest that, for most animals, perception of processes
must be the most important function, since perception is crucial to the control of
action, in a dynamic, sometimes rapidly changing environment that can include
mobile predators and mobile prey, and where different parts of the environment
provide different nutrients, shelter, etc. So from this viewpoint perception of
structures is just a special case of perception of processes – processes in which
not much happens.
Unfortunately, not only has very little (as far as I know) been achieved in
designing visual systems that can perceive a wide range of 3-D spatial structures
(as opposed to recognising objects in images), there is even less AI work on per-
ception of processes, apart from things like online control of simple movements
which involves sensing one or two changing values and sending out simple control
signals, for instance “pole balancing” control systems. There seems also to be
very little research in psychology and neuroscience on the forms of representa-
tions and mechanisms required for perception of processes involving moving or
changing structures, apart from research that merely finds out who can do what
under what conditions. Examples of the latter include [64], [65] and [66].
Addressing that deficiency (including explaining how GLs for process repre-
sentation work) should be a major goal for future vision research, both in com-
putational modelling but also in neuroscience. Some speculations about mecha-
nisms are presented in Section 7.
6.12 Seeing Possible Processes: Proto-affordances
We have already noted that an important feature of process perception is the
ability to consider different ways a process may continue, some of them condi-
tional on other processes intervening, such as an obstacle being moved onto or
off the path of a moving object. Many cases of predictive control include some
element of uncertainty based on imprecise measurements of position, velocity or
acceleration. This sort of uncertainty can be handled using fuzzy or probabilistic
control devices which handle intervals instead of point values.
However there are cases where the issue is not uncertainty or inaccuracy of
measurement but the existence of very different opportunities, such as getting
past an obstacle by climbing over it, or going round it on the left or on the right.
It may be very clear what the alternatives are, and what their advantages and
disadvantages are. E.g one alternative may involve a climb that requires finding
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something to stand on, while another requires a heavy object to be pushed out
of the way, and the third requires squeezing through a narrow gap.
The ability to notice and evaluate distinct possible futures is required not
only when an animal is controlling its own actions but also when it perceives
something else whose motion could continue in different ways. How the ability to
detect such vicarious affordances is used may depend on whether the perceived
mover is someone (or something) the perceiver is trying to help, or a prey animal,
or a predator.
Groups concerned with attempting to conserve an endangered species some-
times have to learn to recognise affordances for members of that species.
In simple cases, prediction and evaluation of alternative futures can make use
of a simulation mechanism. But the requirement to deal explicitly with alter-
native possibilities requires a more sophisticated simulation than is needed for
prediction: a predictive simulation can simply be run to derive a result, whereas
evaluation of alternatives requires the ability to start the simulation with differ-
ent initial conditions so that it produces different results. It also requires some
way of recording the different results so that they can be used later for evalua-
tion or further processing. For example, it may be necessary to use the fact that
after the first choice new situations can arise with new choices that depend on
the first choice. In relatively simple domains, such as discrete board games, stor-
ing multiple branching futures going several steps ahead may use fairly simple
logical or other forms of representation (though space requirements can expand
exponentially with number of steps considered, so that early pruning of poor
alternatives is usually required).
The ability to cope with branching futures in a continuous spatial environ-
ment poses problems that do not arise in “toy” discrete grid-based environments.
The agent has to be able to chunk continuous ranges of options into relatively
small sets of alternatives in order to avoid dealing with explosively branching
paths into the future. How to do this may be something learnt by exploring good
ways to group options by representing situations and possible motions at a high
level of abstraction. For example all the motions that share some topological
feature such as entering a certain region of space can often be grouped together
as one option.
Learning to see good ways of subdividing continuous spatial regions and con-
tinuous ranges of future actions involves developing a good descriptive ontology
at a higher level of abstraction than sensor and motor signals inherently pro-
vide. The structure of the environment, not some feature of sensorimotor signals
makes it sensible to distinguish the three cases: moving forward to one side of
an obstacle, moving so as to make contact with the obstacle and moving so as
to go to the other side. Further useful subdivisions may also be generated by the
environment, e.g. if the wall beyond the left side of the obstacle has two doors
known to lead into the same room beyond the wall, and only the further door is
open.
In addition to “chunking” of possibilities on the basis of differences between
opportunities for an animal or robot to move as a whole there are ways of
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chunking them on the basis of articulation of the agent’s body into independently
movable parts. For example, if there are two hands available, and some task
requires both hands to be used, one to pick an object up and the other to perform
some action on it (e.g. removing its lid) then each hand can be considered for
each task, producing four possible combinations. However if it is difficult or
impossible for either hand to do both tasks, then detecting that difficulty in
advance may make it clear that the set of futures should be pruned by requiring
each hand to do only one task, leaving only two options. Noticing that one task
is better suited to one of the hands can then reduce the set under consideration
to one case, even though that case covers a very large variety of slightly different
processes in the space of motion trajectories.
In humans, and some other species, during the first few years of life a major
function of play and exploration in an infant is providing opportunities for the
discovery of many hundreds of concepts that are useful for chunking sets of pos-
sible states of affairs and possible process, and learning good ways to represent
them so as to facilitate predicting high level consequences, which can then be
used in rapid decision-making strategies.
Being able to detect, reason about, compare and evaluate alternative possible
futures requires a form of representation that goes beyond mere simulation of
the motion, although a simulation that can be restarted at saved decision points
and pushed in different directions when restarted could play a role – and that
may have been a precursor to more sophisticated forms of planning.
More sophisticated mechanisms are required if the results of different forward
projections need to be stored and compared.14 That requires use of a form of
representation that can express abstract summaries of the alternatives, whose
relationships can also be represented during a comparison process, before a deci-
sion is taken, whether it is a decision about what to predict or a decision about
what to do. In the 1960s and 1970s AI researchers showed how to do some of
this using logic-based forms of representation. Doing it with spatial GLs (Sect.
2.2) could use partly similar mechanisms, but different forms of representation
would be required.
The ability to perceive not just what is happening at any time but what the
possible branching futures are – including, good futures, neutral futures, and bad
futures from the point of view of the perceiver’s goals and actions, is an aspect
of J.J. Gibson’s theory of perception as being primarily about affordances for
the perceiver rather than acquisition of information about some objective and
neutral environment. However, I don’t think Gibson considered the need to be
able to represent, compare and evaluate multi-step branching futures: that would
have been incompatible with his adamant denial of any role for representations
and computation.
14 E.g. using a “fully deliberative” architecture, defined in
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#dp0604
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7 Speculation About Mechanisms Required: New Kinds
of Dynamical System
Preceding sections have assembled many facts about animal and human vi-
sion that help to constrain both theories of how brains, or the virtual ma-
chines implemented on brains work, and computer-based models that are in-
tended to replicate or explain human competences. One thing that has not
been mentioned so far is the extraordinary speed with which animal vision
operates. This is a requirement for fast moving animals whose environment
can change rapidly (including animals that fly through tree-tops). An in-
formal demonstration of the speed with which we can process a series of
unrelated photographs and extract quite abstract information about them
is available online here http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/
misc/multipic-challenge.pdf Compare people turning corners, looking out of
trains, coming out of railway stations or airports in new towns, watching TV
documentaries about places never visited, etc.
No known mechanism comes anywhere near explaining how that is possible
especially at the speed with which we do it.
7.1 Sketch of a Possible Mechanism
Fig. 9. A crude impressionistic sketch indicating a collection of dynamical sys-
tems some closely coupled with the environment through sensors and effectors
others more remote, with many causal linkages between different subsystems,
many of which will be dormant at any time. Some of the larger dynamical sys-
tems are composed of smaller ones. The system does not all exist at birth but is
grown, through a lengthy process of learning and development partly driven by
the environment, as sketched in Chappell and Sloman 2007
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Perhaps we need a new kind of dynamical system. Some current researchers
(e.g., [68]) investigate cognition based on dynamical systems composed of sim-
ple “brains” closely coupled with the environment through sensors and effectors.
We need to extend those ideas to allow a multitude of interacting dynamical
systems, some of which can run decoupled from the environment, for instance
during planning and reasoning, as indicated crudely in Figure 9. During process
perception, changing sensory information will drive a collection of linked pro-
cesses at different levels of abstraction. Some of the same processes may occur
when possible but non-existent processes are imagined in order to reason about
their consequences.
Many dynamical systems are defined in terms of continuously changing vari-
ables and interactions defined by differential equations, whereas our previous
discussion, e.g. in Section 5.6, implies that we need mechanisms that can rep-
resent discontinuous as well as continuous changes, for example to cope with
topological changes that occur as objects are moved, or goals become satisfied.
Another piece of evidence for such a requirement is the sort of discrete ‘flip’ that
can occur when viewing well known ambiguous figures such as the Necker cube,
the duck-rabbit, and the old-woman/young-woman picture. It is significant that
such internal flips can occur without any change in sensory input.
It is possible that adult human perception depends on the prior construction
of a very large number of multi-stable dynamical systems each made of many
components that are themselves made of “lower level” multistable dynamical
systems. Many of the subsystems will be dormant at any time, but the mecha-
nisms must support rapidly activating an organised, layered, collection of them
partly under the control of current sensory input, partly under control of current
goals, needs, or expectations, and partly under the control of a large collection
of constraints and preferences linking the different dynamical systems.
On this model, each new perceived scene triggers the activation of a collec-
tion of dynamical systems driven by the low level contents of the optic array and
these in turn trigger the activation of successively higher level dynamical systems
corresponding to more and more complex ontologies, where the construction pro-
cess is constrained simultaneously by general knowledge, the current data, and,
in some cases, immediate contextual knowledge. Sub-systems that are activated
can also influence and help to constrain the activating subsystems, influencing
grouping, thresholding, and removing ambiguities, as happened in the Popeye
program described in Section 6.4.
As processes occur in the scene or the perceiver moves, that will drive changes
in some of the lower level subsystems which in turn will cause changes elsewhere,
causing the perceived processes to be represented by internal processes at differ-
ent levels of abstraction. Some the same mechanisms may be used when when
possible but non-existent processes are imagined in order to reason about their
consequences.
On this view, a human-like visual system is a very complex multi-stable
dynamical system:
– composed of multiple smaller multi-stable dynamical systems
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– that are grown over many years of learning,
– that may be (recursively?) composed of smaller collections of multi-stable
dynamical systems that can be turned on and off as needed,
– some with only discrete attractors, others capable of changing continuously,
– many of them inert or disabled most of the time, but capable of being acti-
vated rapidly,
– each capable of being influenced by other sub-systems or sensory input or
changing current goals, i.e. turned on, then kicked into new (more stable)
states bottom up, top down or sideways,
– constrained in parallel by many other multi-stable sub-systems,
– with mechanisms for interpreting configurations of subsystem-states as rep-
resenting scene structures and affordances, and interpreting changing con-
figurations as representing processes,
– using different such representations at different levels of abstraction changing
on different time scales,
– where the whole system is capable of growing new sub-systems, permanent
or temporary, some short-term (for the current environment) and some long
term (when learning to perceive new things), e.g.
• learning to read text
• learning to sight read music
• learning to play tennis expertly,
etc.
That specification contrasts with “atomic-state dynamical systems”, described
in [69] as dynamical systems:
– with a fixed number of variables that change continuously
– with one global state
– that can only be in one attractor at a time
– with a fixed structure (e.g. a fixed size state vector).
The difficulties of implementing a dynamical system with the desired properties
(including components in which spatial GLs are manipulated) should not be
underestimated. The mechanisms used by brains for this purpose may turn out
to be very different from mechanisms already discovered.
8 Concluding Comments
In [34] it was proposed that we need to replace ‘modular’ architectures with
‘labyrinthine’ architectures, reflecting both the variety of components required
within a visual system and the varieties of interconnectivity between visual sub-
systems and other subsystems (e.g. action control subsystems, auditory subsys-
tems, and various kinds of central systems).
One way to make progress may be to start by relating human vision to the
many evolutionary precursors, including vision in other animals. If newer systems
did not replace older ones, but built on them, that suggests that many research
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questions need to be rephrased to assume that many different kinds of visual
processing are going on concurrently, especially when a process is perceived that
involves different levels of abstraction perceived concurrently, e.g. continuous
physical and geometric changes relating parts of visible surfaces and spaces at
the lowest level, discrete changes, including topological and causal changes at
a higher level, and in some cases intentional actions, successes, failures, near
misses, etc. at a still more abstract level. The different levels use different on-
tologies, different forms of representation, and probably different mechanisms,
yet they are all interconnected, and all in partial registration with the optic array
(not with retinal images, since perceived processes survive saccades).
It is very important to take account of the fact that those ontologies are
not to be defined only in terms of what is going on inside the organism (i.e.
in the nervous system and the body) since a great deal of the information an
organism needs is not about what is happening in it, but what is happening in
the environment, though the environment is not some unique given (as implicitly
assumed in Marr’s theory of vision (1982), for example) but is different for
different organisms, even when located in the same place. They have different
niches.
As Ulric Neisser pointed out in his (1976) it is folly to study only minds and
brains without studying the environments those minds and brains evolved to
function in.
One of the major points emphasised here is that coping with our environment
requires humans to be able to perceive, predict, plan, explain, reason about, and
control processes of many kinds, and some of that ability is closely related to our
ability to do mathematical reasoning about geometric and topological structures
and processes. So perhaps trying to model the development of a mathematician
able to do spatial reasoning will turn out to provide a major stepping stone to
explaining how human vision works and producing convincing working models.
Perhaps it will show that Immanuel Kant got something right about the nature
of mathematical knowledge, all those years ago.
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